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Moreover, we find compelling evidence to support the intersectionality theory. 
According to this theory, when sex and race unite, a new form of discrimination 
emerges that cannot be explained by sexism or racism alone. The data unequivocally 
indicates that the race and sex of same-sex applicants play a role and result in a 
unique and previously unobserved pattern. This discriminatory pattern plagues 
every region in the United States, and it transcends party lines (that is, it is present 
in red, blue, and swing states). Furthermore, upending conventional wisdom, the 
data reveals that big banks discriminate at the same rate as small banks, and lend-
ers in urban environments are as discriminatory as rural lenders. Prior studies 
failed to reveal this phenomenon due to data constraints and design flaws. These 
studies relied on testers posing as applicants, and none could investigate how inter-
sectionality influences lending practices. 
Despite the grim results, a silver lining exists. We find that the pattern of dis-
crimination diminishes or disappears in states and localities that pass anti–sexual 
orientation discrimination laws. These findings have important and timely implica-
tions. In 2017, a new bill offering nationwide protection from sexual orientation credit 
discrimination was introduced. The same year experienced tectonic changes in 
Title VII jurisprudence. Our study can reinvigorate the debate and help policymak-
ers tailor remedies that would correct the discriminatory pattern this study unravels. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, a gay couple entered their local bank in 
Arroyo Grande, California to ask for a mortgage loan. Excited, 
they filled out the application. But the festive event took a sur-
prising turn. The couple was quickly asked to leave and even close 
their existing accounts. “It was bank policy,” so they learned, “not 
to offer home loans to gay applicants.”1 
While recent years brought more legal protections2 to mem-
bers of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB3) community, our data 
suggests that they should not expect to be treated equally. This 
should not come as a surprise. Federal law and the majority of 
states do not prohibit lenders from discriminating against appli-
cants based on their sexual orientation. Simply put, when it 
comes to mortgage lending, sexual orientation discrimination is 
the rule. 
Not only is explicit sexual orientation discrimination permit-
ted; it can be used by lenders as a “defense.”4 This defense is often 
raised when the mortgage applicant belongs to a protected group. 
For example, a lender who discriminated against a black appli-
cant could escape liability if it shows that the source of discrimi-
nation was not the applicant’s race (a protected characteristic 
that gives rise to liability) but his sexual orientation. To be blunt, 
the bank can claim, “I discriminated against the applicant not be-
cause he was black, but because he was gay.”5 
 1 Telephone Interview with Ms. Renee Spears (Dec 30, 2017) (on file with authors); 
Rebekah Coleman, Gay Discrimination in the Mortgage Industry (Loans.org, Apr 12, 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/CC58-DRYG. 
 2 See generally, for example, Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S Ct 2584 (2015) (holding that 
states cannot ban same-sex marriage); United States v Windsor, 570 US 744 (2013) (de-
ciding that the Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of marriage as between a man and a 
woman was unconstitutional). 
 3 Note that the “T” for transgender individuals is omitted. The reason is that courts 
have interpreted the prohibition against sex discrimination to also include discrimination 
against transgender applicants or, more broadly, gender identity discrimination. See 
Part I.A.1. 
 4 We use the term “defense” here loosely to mean that the defendant was able to 
undermine the plaintiff’s ability to prove her case for unlawful discrimination. By contrast, 
an affirmative defense “is asserted only after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case 
. . . against the defendant.” See Davenport v Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property 
Regime, 508 SE2d 565, 571 (SC 1998) (comparing the defenses of implied primary and 
implied secondary assumption of risk). 
5 See notes 74–80 and accompanying text. 
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There are a few exceptions. A small (but growing) number of 
states now prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in mortgage 
lending.6 Even in states where such discrimination is permissible, 
some strongholds exist: certain localities decided to prohibit what 
federal law and their state allow. For example, Michigan does not 
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in mortgage lending, 
but the city of Ann Arbor does.7 The same is true for Atlanta, the 
only municipality in Georgia to protect LGB individuals.8 By con-
trast, two states, Arkansas and Tennessee, prohibit any local leg-
islation that would protect against sexual orientation discrimina-
tion.9 In these states, the ability to discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation is protected by statute. Finally, lenders of 
mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA), known as “FHA loans,” are not allowed to discriminate 
based on sexual orientation.10 But as the data reveals, sexual ori-
entation discrimination—even in FHA loans—not only exists but 
is prevalent. 
In what follows, we present the first econometric evidence of 
widespread bias in mortgage lending on the basis of perceived 
sexual orientation. Using data provided by the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act11 (HMDA), we evaluate the probability of home 
loan acceptance for virtually every FHA loan between the years 
2010 and 2015. The dataset is unique in a number of respects. 
First, it is large, containing more than five million observations. 
This allows us to show that the discrimination is widespread, sta-
tistically significant, and robust. Second, the dataset is rich 
 6 For a partial list, see Ending Housing Discrimination against Lesbian, Gay, 
and Transgender Individuals and Their Families (Department of Housing and Urban 
Development), archived at http://perma.cc/77JP-JXCM. 
 7 City of Ann Arbor Code, Ch 112, § 9:150 (defining discrimination as making a de-
cision based on the “actual or perceived . . . sexual orientation . . . of another person or that 
person’s relatives or associates”). 
 8 Atlanta, Ga, Ord Ch 94, Art IV, § 94–96 (prohibiting businesses engaged in resi-
dential real estate–related transactions from discriminating on the basis of actual or per-
ceived sexual orientation). See also Cities & Counties with Non-discrimination Ordinances 
That Include Sexual Orientation (Human Rights Campaign, Jan 28, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6QU6-TRSR. 
 9 See Ark Code Ann § 14-1-403 (“A county, municipality, or other political subdivi-
sion of the state shall not adopt or enforce an ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that 
creates a protected classification or prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in 
state law.”); Tenn Code Ann § 7-51-1802 (including a similar prohibition). 
 10 Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or 
Gender Identity, 77 Fed Reg 5662, 5662 (2012), codified at 24 CFR § 5 et seq (Equal Access 
Rule). 
11 Pub L No 94-200, 89 Stat 1125, (1975), codified as amended at 12 USC § 2801 et seq. 
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enough to allow us to estimate acceptance rates for perceived LGB 
couples of all gender and racial compositions (for example, appli-
cations filed by two black males, two white males, a white male 
and a black male, two black females, etc.). Lastly, it has a geo-
graphical level of granularity that allows us to examine small ge-
ographic areas—down to a neighborhood level. 
The results are alarming. We find that same-sex male co-
applicants (or pairs) are between 2.5 and 7.5 percentage points 
less likely to have their loan application accepted compared to the 
white heterosexual baseline.12 This is true despite the fact that 
the same-sex male pairs were identical in all reported respects to 
the heterosexual baseline. That is, same-sex male pairs filed a 
mortgage application with the same lender, in the same county, 
for the same loan amount, for the same purpose, had the same 
income, and posed the same level of risk to the lender. Neverthe-
less, discrimination rules. The results are statistically significant 
at the 99 percent level. 
Moreover, we find compelling evidence to support the inter-
sectionality theory.13 According to this theory, when sex and race 
unite, a new form of discrimination emerges that cannot be ex-
plained by sexism or racism alone. The data unequivocally indi-
cates that, in addition to sex and sexual orientation, race also 
plays a significant role. The result is a unique and previously un-
observed pattern. Although applications of all same-sex male 
pairs are less likely to be accepted, male pairs with black appli-
cants are substantially worse off. From most to least discrimi-
nated groups are (i) pairs consisting of two black males (denoted 
black male/black male), followed by (ii) interracial pairs in which 
the black male is the primary applicant and the white male is the 
secondary applicant, then (iii) interracial pairs in which the white 
 12 In a joint mortgage application filed by two individuals, one is listed as the “pri-
mary” applicant and the other as a “secondary” applicant. In our baseline, the white male 
is the primary applicant and the white female is the secondary applicant—the most com-
mon combination in the dataset. 
 13 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, 1989 
U Chi Legal F 139, 140 (explaining how courts’ failure to understand and properly analyze 
intersectional claims can leave subsets of protected groups—for example, black females—
without a Title VII remedy, and warning that, “[b]ecause the intersectional experience is 
greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersection-
ality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women 
are subordinated”); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 Stan L Rev 1241, 1244 (1991) (exploring 
“the various ways in which race and gender intersect in shaping structural, political, and 
representational aspects of violence against women of color”). 
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male is the primary applicant and the black male is the second-
ary, and finally (iv) white male pairs. The differences are signifi-
cant. An application filed by a pair of two black males is three 
times less likely to be accepted compared to an application filed 
by a pair of two white males, and both pairs face discrimination 
compared to the heterosexual baseline. 
Consistent with the social science literature, the data sug-
gests that perceived gay male couples are treated differently than 
perceived lesbian couples.14 While every possible racial combina-
tion of same-sex male co-applicants is statistically disadvantaged, 
the treatment of same-sex female co-applicants is either indistin-
guishable or preferable compared to the white heterosexual base-
line couple. Interestingly, however, we observe the exact same ra-
cial pattern as in the male pairs: within the female pair group, a 
pair of two black females is the least likely to be approved, fol-
lowed by interracial pairs of black female/white female, then 
white female/black female pairs, and finally white female pairs. 
This pattern of discrimination is not isolated to a specific geo-
graphical region or political ideology. Rather, we find evidence that 
this form of discrimination transcends geographical and political 
borders. In all four regions in the United States, applications of 
same-sex male pairs are less likely to be accepted compared to the 
baseline white heterosexual pairs (although in certain cases, the 
 14 See, for example, Nathanael Lauster and Adam Easterbrook, No Room for New 
Families? A Field Experiment Measuring Rental Discrimination against Same-Sex 
Couples and Single Parents, 58 Soc Probs 389, 401 (2011) (concluding, based on a field 
experiment, that “same-sex male couples saw the greatest rental discrimination . . . and 
were nearly 25 percent less likely to receive a positive response to a typical apartment 
inquiry” compared to heterosexual and same-sex female couples). In two different studies, 
Professors Ali Ahmed and Mats Hammarstedt found that gay couples are discriminated 
against in the rental market in Sweden (compared to heterosexual couples) but could not 
find a differential treatment between lesbian couples and heterosexual couples, suggesting 
that the discrimination was mainly against gay male couples. See Ali M. Ahmed and Mats 
Hammarstedt, Detecting Discrimination against Homosexuals: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment on the Internet, 76 Economica 588, 592 (2009); Ali M. Ahmed, Lina Andersson, 
and Mats Hammarstedt, Are Lesbians Discriminated against in the Rental Housing 
Market? Evidence from a Correspondence Testing Experiment, 17 J Housing Econ 234, 
236–37 (2008). Similar findings—discrimination against gay male individuals but not les-
bian individuals—were also documented in the labor market. See Ahmed, Andersson, and 
Hammarstedt, 17 J Housing Econ at 234, 236–37 (cited in note 14) (reviewing the litera-
ture on labor market discrimination against gay and lesbian individuals and finding that 
there is little evidence for labor market discrimination against lesbians); Bruce Elmslie 
and Edinaldo Tebaldi, Sexual Orientation and Labor Market Discrimination, 28 J Labor 
Rsrch 436, 436, 449–50 (2007) (finding that gay men face wage discrimination while les-
bian women do not); Gregory M. Herek, Gender Gaps in Public Opinion about Lesbians 
and Gay Men, 66 Pub Op Q 40, 58 (2002) (“[A]ggregate attitudes tend to be more hostile 
toward gay men than lesbians.”). 
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results are statistically insignificant).15 Interestingly, we find that 
interracial male co-applicants (that is, white/black and 
black/white) face the most discrimination in the Northeast. Their 
applications are 12.2 percentage points less likely to be accepted 
compared to the baseline (the results are statistically significant 
at the 99 percent level). Splitting the data by political affiliation 
does not change the results in a meaningful way. It reveals that 
Democratic states are as discriminatory as Republican states 
overall and, in fact, are the least tolerant of interracial male pairs. 
The same trend also holds irrespective of the size of the lender. 
That is, big lenders discriminate in the same way as small banks. 
Using a difference-in-differences framework, we do find, however, 
that efforts by states and localities to pass laws prohibiting sexual 
orientation discrimination tend to be successful in discouraging 
sexual orientation discrimination. 
The Article contributes to the economic and empirical re-
search in a number of ways. First, it highlights a new dimension 
of discrimination that has been previously ignored. Surprisingly, 
of the very few studies that attempted to explore sexual orienta-
tion discrimination, to date only two studies focused on mortgage 
lending. The first study compared the treatment of testers posing 
as heterosexual couples with testers posing as same-sex couples 
with better credentials.16 The second study was also empirical in 
nature.17 However, both studies suffered from limitations.18 Most 
importantly, their design did not allow the researchers to test how 
the intersectionality of race, sex, and sexual orientation influ-
ences home lending practices.19 For example, the studies could not 
analyze whether black and white couples are treated differently 
or whether black female couples are treated differently than 
15 See Part II.C.2. 
 16 Sexual Orientation and Housing Discrimination in Michigan: A Report of Michigan’s 
Fair Housing Centers *5 (Michigan’s Fair Housing Centers, Jan 30, 2007), archived at 
http://perma.cc/CC58-WSN6 (Michigan Study). 
17 See generally Lei Gao and Hua Sun, The Rainbow of Credit: Same-Sex Mortgage 
Discrimination and Two-Sided Spillover Effect (Iowa State University College of Business 
Working Paper, Apr 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/SGT5-MD4M. 
18 See Part I.D.3. 
 19 In the Michigan Study, the couples posing as heterosexual and same-sex were of 
the same race. Similarly, Professors Lei Gao and Hua Sun tested the approval rate of all 
same-sex couples, controlling for race but not exploring the comparisons or interplay be-
tween race and sexual orientation. This design did not allow them to address the intersec-
tionality question—how race and sex impact the approval rates—or to test how state and 
local rules impact these rates. 
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white female couples. They overlooked the existence and magni-
tude of intersectional discrimination and were unable to reveal 
the patterns we observe here. Second, our study is also the first 
to measure the presence and magnitude of sexual orientation dis-
crimination regarding mortgages that are subject to the Equal 
Access Rule20—the only type of mortgage in which discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is prohibited nationwide. Third, our 
study indicates that the prior literature may have underesti-
mated the magnitude of sexual orientation discrimination. The 
reason for this is the failure of these studies to distinguish be-
tween same-sex male couples and same-sex female couples. The 
data suggests that the second group—female couples—is treated 
as well or more favorably compared to male couples and even com-
pared to the heterosexual baseline. Thus, studies that treated 
LGB individuals as one homogenous group likely underestimated 
the discrimination faced by gay males. Fourth, ours is the only 
study to address the efficacy of state and local laws designed to 
discourage sexual orientation–based discrimination. 
Our study also suggests that the observed discrimination is 
not motivated by lenders’ attempts to assess the risk associated 
with the applicants by segmenting the market. Rather, because 
we compare applications with the same level of risk to the 
lender,21 it is more likely that the discrimination is motivated by 
bigotry (conscious or otherwise). The distinction is important. To 
eliminate discrimination, policymakers—legislators and regula-
tors—must know the motivating force. 
Our study is timely. In May 2017, a new bill was introduced 
offering nationwide protection from discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation to those seeking credit.22 In the same year, 
Title VII jurisprudence experienced a tectonic change when the 
Seventh Circuit held, for the first time, that sexual orientation 
discrimination is prohibited under Title VII.23 A month later, the 
same holding was adopted by a federal court in the Southern 
20 See Equal Access Rule, 77 Fed Reg at 5662 (cited in note 10). See also Part I.A.3. 
21 See Part II.A.1. 
22 See Freedom from Discrimination in Credit Act, HR 2498, 115th Cong, 1st Sess, 
in 163 Cong Rec H 4310 (daily ed May 17, 2017). The Act would amend the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in the provision of credit. 
Previous versions were introduced in 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. 
 23 See Hively v Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F3d 339, 341 (7th Cir 
2017) (en banc) (holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is illegal 
sex discrimination under Title VII). 
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District of New York;24 and by April 2018, the First Circuit25 and 
Second Circuit26 joined what now seems like a trend.27 Our study 
can help reinvigorate the debate and help policymakers tailor 
remedies that would correct the discriminatory pattern that this 
study unravels. 
The rest of the Article continues as follows: Part I first out-
lines the law and reveals the perverse results of the sexual orien-
tation discrimination defense. It then discusses two important 
forms of discriminatory practices and how two common reme-
dies—which we later test—may affect these practices. Part I.C 
then turns to review the prior studies and their shortcomings. 
Part II discusses the study’s methodology and the results. The 
Article then provides concluding remarks. 
I.  SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 
A. Federal Law 
The two main federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in 
mortgage lending are the Fair Housing Act28 (FH Act) and the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act29 (ECOA). The first focuses on res-
idential real estate transactions, while the second focuses more 
broadly on any credit transaction. Together, they make it unlaw-
ful for any lender to discriminate against a protected applicant by 
denying a mortgage or providing unfavorable terms or condi-
tions.30 The federal statutes, however, are limited in scope: they 
 24 See Philpott v New York, 252 F Supp 3d 313, 315 (SDNY 2017) (holding that a 
sexual orientation discrimination claim is “cognizable under Title VII”). 
 25 See Franchina v City of Providence, 881 F3d 32, 54 (1st Cir 2018) (holding that a 
plaintiff may recover under a “sex-plus claim[ ] . . . where, in addition to the sex-based 
charge, the ‘plus’ factor is the plaintiff’s status as a gay or lesbian individual”). 
 26 See Zarda v Altitude Express, Inc, 883 F3d 100, 112 (2d Cir 2018) (en banc) (hold-
ing that “sexual orientation discrimination is . . . a subset of sex discrimination”). 
 27 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v R.G. & G.R. 
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc, 884 F3d 560, 574–75 (6th Cir 2018) (relying on the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis in Hively in holding that “discrimination on the basis of transgender and 
transitioning status violates Title VII”); Wittmer v Phillips 66 Co, 304 F Supp 3d 627, 634 
(SD Tex 2018) (adopting Zarda’s rationale and holding that “[t]he same is true for discrim-
ination based on transgender status”); United States v Dental Dreams, LLC, 307 F Supp 
3d 1224, 1253 (D NM 2018) (recognizing that sexual orientation discrimination is prohib-
ited under Title VII). 
28 Pub L No 90-284, 82 Stat 81 (1968), codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq. 
29 Pub L No 93-495, 88 Stat 1521 (1974), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1691 et seq. 
30 See 42 USC § 3605(a): 
It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes en-
gaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any 
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prohibit discriminatory lending practices if they are based on 
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.31 Although the ECOA 
and FH Act include other bases for discrimination,32 neither pro-
tects against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.33 
The result is that lenders can discriminate against LGB individ-
uals (or those perceived as such) with impunity. There are, how-
ever, a few exceptions. 
1. Discrimination against a protected class.
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation may be ille-
gal if it also violates the prohibition against discrimination 
against a protected class. An example is declining to give a mort-
gage to a gay applicant for fear of contracting HIV.34 Such behav-
ior is illegal discrimination on the basis of disability—a protected 
person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of 
such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, 
or national origin. 
See also 15 USC § 1691(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against 
any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided the applicant has 
the capacity to contract).”). 
31 See 42 USC §§ 3601–19; 15 USC § 1691. 
 32 See 15 USC § 1691(a)(1) (making it unlawful to discriminate based on marital 
status or age); 42 USC § 3605(a) (prohibiting discrimination based on familial status and 
handicap). 
33 This interpretation may soon change. Many circuit courts view the ECOA and the 
FH Act as statutes in pari materia with Title VII, which is now interpreted by some courts 
as also protecting against sexual orientation discrimination. See notes 23–26. For circuits 
holding that Title VII jurisprudence applies in ECOA cases, see Wise v Vilsack, 496 Fed 
Appx 283, 285 (4th Cir 2012); Rosa v Park West Bank & Trust Co, 214 F3d 213, 215 (1st 
Cir 2000); Lewis v ACB Business Services, Inc, 135 F3d 389, 406 (6th Cir 1998). For circuits 
holding that Title VII jurisprudence applies in FH Act cases, see Gamble v City of Escondido, 
104 F3d 300, 304 (9th Cir 1997); Larkin v Michigan Department of Social Services, 89 F3d 
285, 289 (6th Cir 1996); Cabrera v Jakabovitz, 24 F3d 372, 383 (2d Cir 1994); Ring v First 
Interstate Mortgage, Inc, 984 F2d 924, 926 (8th Cir 1993); Doe v City of Butler, 892 F2d 
315 (3d Cir 1989). 
 34 See Equal Access Rule, 77 Fed Reg at 5668 (cited in note 10) (explaining that the 
FH Act “prohibits discrimination against someone who has or is regarded as having a dis-
ability, including HIV/AIDS”). For similar examples in the context of eviction from a rental 
property, see Memorandum for FHEO Reginal Directors regarding Assessing Complaints 
That Involve Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression *1 (Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, June 15, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/LU6T 
-D965; Fact Sheet: Fair Housing for LGBT Persons *1 (Fair Housing Center of West 
Michigan), archived at http://perma.cc/D79Q-EXU9 (noting that the FH Act’s protection 
against housing discrimination on the basis of disability applies not only “to individuals 
with disabilities, but also to people who are regarded by others to have a disability whether 
or not they in fact have a disability”). 
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characteristic under the FH Act.35 This protection includes not 
only actual physical impairment but also “being regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment.”36 
Similarly, courts have interpreted the prohibition against sex 
discrimination broadly to include discrimination based on gender 
identity or perceived gender nonconformity.37 As a result, the 
ECOA and FH Act now afford protection to transgender appli-
cants and, under certain circumstances, to LGB individuals.38 The 
leading precedent is Price Waterhouse v Hopkins,39 a Title VII de-
cision. Price Waterhouse involved a female plaintiff whose candi-
dacy for partnership was put on hold. It was clear that her gender 
played a role in the employer’s decision.40 In addition to legitimate 
criticism, some of the plaintiff’s colleagues described her as 
“macho” and advised her to take a “course at charm school.”41 The 
head of her office—her biggest supporter42—was more explicit. He 
advised the plaintiff that, to improve her chances, she “should 
‘walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femi-
ninely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.’”43 
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court held that discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender-based stereotypes constitutes illegal 
sex discrimination.44 The decision was later construed as also pro-
tecting transgender plaintiffs. As the Sixth Circuit explained, if 
discriminating against women who do not wear dresses consti-
tutes sex discrimination, “[i]t follows that employers who discrimi-
nate against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or 
otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination.”45 
35 42 USC § 3605(a). 
36 42 USC § 3602(h)(3). 
37 The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) adopted a similar 
view. See generally Ending Housing Discrimination (cited in note 6). 
38 See notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 39 490 US 228 (1989), superseded on other grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Stat 1071, 1075-76, codified at 42 USC § 2000e–2(m). 
40 Id at 235. 
41 Id. 
42 Hopkins v Price Waterhouse, 618 F Supp 1109, 1117 (DDC 1985), affd in part, revd 
in part, 825 F2d 458 (DC Cir 1987), revd, 490 US 228 (1989). 
43 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 235. 
 44 See id at 250 (Brennan) (plurality) (stating that, “[i]n the specific context of sex-
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be ag-
gressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender”). See also id at 258–61 
(White concurring); id at 272–73 (O’Connor concurring). 
45 Smith v City of Salem, 378 F3d 566, 574 (6th Cir 2004). The extent of the protec-
tion, however, is still unclear. Some courts take the view that discrimination against a 
transgender plaintiff is unlawful only when it is based on gender stereotypes. See Etsitty 
12 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1 
Price Waterhouse’s holding and its progeny were adopted in 
the mortgage lending context.46 But even after Price Waterhouse, 
sexual orientation remains an unprotected characteristic.47 Still, 
as in the case of disability, discrimination against LGB individuals 
may be illegal if it is based on perceived nonconformity with gender 
stereotypes (a protected characteristic post–Price Waterhouse). 
This means that a gay male applicant who was wearing women’s 
clothing would have a valid cause of action if his application was 
denied because the loan officer thought he did not meet stereo-
typed expectations of masculinity.48 If, however, the lender could 
show that sexual orientation was the sole reason for the discrim-
ination—that is, the applicant was discriminated against because 
the loan officer believed he was gay—the plaintiff’s suit would 
fail.49 Put differently, the LGB plaintiff cannot simply argue that 
she was discriminated against because of her sexual orientation. 
Rather, she needs to show that the discrimination was based on 
a protected basis like sex stereotyping. As Part I.B demonstrates, 
however, such a showing is often impossible. 
v Utah Transit Authority, 502 F3d 1215, 1222, 1224 (10th Cir 2007) (holding that “trans-
sexuals may not claim protection under Title VII from discrimination based solely on their 
status as a transsexual . . . [r]ather, [a transgender individual’s] claim must rest entirely 
on the Price Waterhouse theory of protection as a man who fails to conform to sex stereo-
types,” and concluding that an employer is not “require[d] [ ] to allow biological males to 
use women’s restrooms”); Smith, 378 F3d at 575. Other courts have taken a more expan-
sive approach, arguing that discrimination against transgender individuals is prohibited 
per se. See Glenn v Brumby, 663 F3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir 2011) (“A person is defined as 
transgender precisely because of the perception that [their] behavior transgresses gender 
stereotypes.”); Macy v Holder, 2012 WL 1435995, *11 (EEOC) (“[I]ntentional discrimina-
tion against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, 
discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’ and such discrimination therefore violates Title VII.”). 
This also seems to be the view of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). See 
Letter from Richard Cordray to Michael Adams and Aaron Tax, Application of the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act to Credit Discrimination on the Bases of Gender Identity and Sexual 
Orientation *7 (Aug 30, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/G6V6-YY47 (CFPB Letter) (re-
lying on Title VII jurisprudence to conclude that “the prohibition of sex discrimination in 
ECOA and Regulation B affords broad protection against credit discrimination on the ba-
ses of gender identity and sexual orientation”). For a review of the two approaches, see 
generally Karen Moulding, 1 Sexual Orientation and the Law § 10:5 (Westlaw 2017). 
46 See Rosa, 214 F3d at 215 (discussed in notes 73–80). 
 47 See Smith v Mission Association Ltd Partnership, 225 F Supp 2d 1293, 1299 (D 
Kan 2002) (“Sexual orientation claims are not actionable under the [FH Act].”). 
48 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 241–42. The plaintiff in these cases needs to show 
only that nonconformity with gender stereotypes was a consideration even if other consid-
erations, such as the plaintiff’s sexual orientation, were also taken into account. See, for 
example, Centola v Potter, 183 F Supp 2d 403, 409 (D Mass 2002) (“[Plaintiff] does not 
need to allege that he suffered discrimination on the basis of his sex alone or that sexual 
orientation played no part in his treatment.”). 
49 See Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 241–42. 
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2. Agencies’ interpretations and regulatory enforcement.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)—the 
agency responsible for enforcing and administering the ECOA50—
has taken a broader view than the federal courts. Contrary to 
Price Waterhouse, the CFPB’s director opined in a letter issued in 
2016 that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex dis-
crimination.51 The opinion relied on two grounds: (a) recent deci-
sions issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC)52 and (b) the theory of discrimination by association. In 
the mortgage lending context, this theory prohibits a loan officer 
from denying an applicant based on her association with a person 
belonging to a protected class.53 For example, the doctrine prohib-
its a lender from discriminating against a white applicant whose 
spouse is black. The CFPB’s director took the stance that the 
same theory prohibits discrimination against applicants based on 
the sex of their partners and, therefore, prohibits sexual orienta-
tion discrimination.54 Despite the CFPB’s expansive view and its 
efforts to solicit complaints from consumers, it is unclear how ac-
tive and effective the agency is in dealing with discriminatory 
practices.55 
3. FHA mortgage insurance and the Equal Access Rule.
There is one category of loans in which sexual orientation dis-
crimination is wholly prohibited and on which our study focuses: 
50 15 USC §§ 1691–1691f; 12 CFR Part 1002. 
51 CFPB Letter at *4–7 (cited in note 45). 
52 Id at *4. 
53 The doctrine was adopted already in 1985 by the Federal Reserve in its official 
interpretation of Regulation B. 50 Fed Reg 48018, 48049 (1985). It was reaffirmed by the 
CFPB in the restated Regulation B. 76 Fed Reg 79442, 79473 (2011); 81 Fed Reg 25323, 
25325 (2016); 12 CFR Part 1002, Supp I, § 2(z)-1: 
As used in this part, prohibited basis refers not only to characteristics—the race, 
color, religion . . . of an applicant . . . but also to the characteristics of individuals 
with whom an applicant is affiliated or with whom the applicant associates. This 
means, for example, that under the general rule stated in § 1002.4(a), a creditor 
may not discriminate against an applicant . . . because of the race of other resi-
dents in the neighborhood where the property offered as collateral is located. 
See also Interagency Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed Reg 18266, 
18268 (1994) (“A lender may not discriminate on a prohibited basis because of the charac-
teristics of: [a] person associated with a credit applicant.”). 
54 See CFPB Letter at *4 (cited in note 45). 
 55 Unlike HUD, the CFPB does not provide any information about the number of 
complaints alleging discriminatory behavior. A search on its database yielded only a hand-
ful of discrimination-related claims, none of which seems to be in the mortgage lending 
context. 
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FHA-backed mortgages. The prohibition is articulated in the 
Equal Access Rule adopted in 2012 by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), the agency responsible for ad-
ministering the FH Act.56 The rule prohibits lenders of mortgages 
insured by the FHA (commonly referred to as FHA loans) from 
considering applicants’ actual or perceived sexual orientation, 
gender identity, or marital status.57 This means that a lender 
would be in violation of the Equal Access Rule if it denied an FHA 
mortgage because the applicant was (or was believed to be) gay.58 
The rule, however, is limited in scope and has—as our study 
shows—a limited effect. To begin with, FHA loans comprise a sig-
nificant but still limited portion of the market. According to 
HUD’s Office of Risk Management and Regulatory Affairs, in 
2017, FHA single-family home mortgage insurance measured by 
loan count was only 16.7 percent.59 That market share drops to 
13.4 percent if measured by dollar volume.60 The upshot is that 
the majority of mortgage loans are not subject to the Equal Access 
Rule. 
Moreover, the rule does not provide applicants with a private 
cause of action.61 As a result, the sole remedy available to appli-
cants who believe the rule was violated is to complain to HUD.62 
Few complaints, however, are filed and processed every year, and 
even fewer result in a charge of discrimination.63 
 56 See Equal Access Rule, 77 Fed Reg at 5662 (cited in note 10). See also generally 
Ending Housing Discrimination (cited in note 6). 
57 Equal Access Rule, 77 Fed Reg at 5662 (cited in note 10). 
58 See also generally Ending Housing Discrimination (cited in note 6). 
59 FHA Single Family Market Share *4 (Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Apr 18, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/52JA-WJD5 (providing statistics 
based on yearly activity and including purchased and refinanced loans). In 2009, the FHA 
market share peaked at 21.1 percent but remained at around 13 percent between 2012 
and 2014. 
60 See id at *2. 
 61 See Equal Access Rule, 77 Fed Reg at 5666 (cited in note 10) (refusing to interpret 
the FH Act as protecting against discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and 
gender identity and explaining that the rule does not “create additional protected classes 
in existing civil rights laws”). 
62 See id at 5671. 
63 According to the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA), in 2016, only 28,181 
complaints were filed nationwide for housing discrimination. Of these, 4.86 percent were 
processed by HUD, and only 150 complaints (0.01 percent) included sexual orientation 
discrimination claims. The Case for Fair Housing: 2017 Fair Housing Trends Report *79 
(National Fair Housing Alliance, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/QRK5-7MC3. The 
NFHA’s reports are available at http://nationalfairhousing.org/reports-research (visited 
Nov 27, 2018). 
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B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a Defense 
Not only is sexual orientation discrimination permissible, but 
it can also serve as a “defense” in jurisdictions that have not fol-
lowed Hively v Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana64 and 
Zarda v Altitude Express, Inc.65 The reason is the law of causation. 
In a discrimination case, the plaintiff has to show that the lender 
considered an illegitimate motive (for example, the applicant’s 
race). In addition, the plaintiff must prove that the illegitimate 
motive was the cause of the discriminatory decision.66 Despite 
burden-shifting frameworks,67 meeting the causation require-
ment is not easy. For members of the LGB community, it may be 
impossible.68 
To illustrate, consider a black male with perfect credit whose 
application was refused. Suppose also that he came to the lender 
dressed in what some would consider feminine attire.69 Here, the 
basis for the discriminatory action is unclear. It could be that the 
applicant was discriminated against because of his sex (male), his 
64 853 F3d 339 (7th Cir 2017) (en banc). 
 65 883 F3d 100 (2d Cir 2018) (en banc). Hively and Zarda, which held that sexual 
orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination, were decided after the cases 
this Section references and mark a new trend. See notes 23–27, 248–49, and accompanying 
text. However, the early line of cases this Section discusses illustrate reasoning that could 
still come into play today in jurisdictions that have not adopted or explicitly rejected Hively 
and Zarda. See, for example, Bostock v Clayton County Board of Commissioners, 723 Fed 
Appx 964, 965 (11th Cir 2018) (adhering, per curiam, to prior Eleventh Circuit precedents 
foreclosing complaints for sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII). 
66 See notes 31–32. 
67 When a single motive guides the defendant’s decision, courts often apply the 
burden-shifting approach established in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 
802–03 (1973). See also Husman v Toyota Motor Credit Corp, 12 Cal App 5th 1168, 1182–
83 (2017) (explaining that, in mixed-motives cases, courts apply the Price Waterhouse 
framework). Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff must first prove a discrimi-
natory decision and offer facts suggesting the decision was based on an illegitimate motive. 
The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the action had a legitimate motive. 
If the defendant meets the burden, the plaintiff must show that the lender’s reason is only 
pretextual or provide evidence of intentional discrimination. See also Dee Pridgen and 
Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Credit and the Law § 3:16 (Westlaw 2017) (noting that 
with the exception of the Seventh Circuit, “proof of discrimination in ECOA ‘disparate 
treatment’ suits will be subject to the analysis of McDonnell Douglas, as is the case with 
other discrimination claims, such as Title VII.”); Ring, 984 F2d at 926 (“We have no doubt 
that the three-stage McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis applies to Fair Housing Act 
cases.”). 
 68 See also Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 251 (noting that mere remarks based on sex 
stereotypes do not prove that gender considerations guided the challenged decision; ra-
ther, “[t]he plaintiff must show that the [defendants] actually relied on her gender in mak-
ing [their] decision”). 
 69 The example is based on Rosa, 214 F3d 213. See notes 74–80 and accompanying 
text. 
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race (black), or his perceived gender identity (failing to meet ste-
reotyped expectations of masculinity as a cross-dresser). In any of 
these cases, the applicant has a valid cause of action, but the 
lender may have a defense. It could be argued that the discrimi-
nation was based on the applicant’s actual or perceived sexual 
orientation (being gay or perceived as gay). Here, the question of 
the lender’s motive is paramount. If the sole reason for denying 
the application was an illegal consideration—for example, the 
male applicant’s effeminate dressing style—the plaintiff would 
prevail.70 In such a case, the denial is considered impermissible 
sex discrimination because it is based on the applicant’s noncon-
formity with sex stereotypes. By contrast, if the sole motivation 
for rejecting the application is the loan officer’s belief that the ap-
plicant is gay, the consideration is deemed “legitimate” and per-
missible.71 Finally, suppose that the loan officer’s motivation was 
“based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considera-
tions.”72 In these cases, the lender can still avoid paying damages if 
it proves that the legitimate motive alone (for example, denying the 
application because the applicant was perceived as gay) would have 
led it to make the same decision (that is, denying the application).73 
If this sounds too fantastic, consider Rosa v Park West Bank 
and Trust.74 In Rosa, a bank employee refused to give the plaintiff 
(Rosa), a transgender individual wearing “traditionally female at-
tire,” a loan application unless he “went home and changed.”75 
70 See Part I.A.1. 
 71 See, for example, Husman, 12 Cal App 5th at 1182–83 (discussing the burden-
shifting procedures in single-motive and mixed-motives cases). 
72 Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 241. 
73 See id at 252 (holding that the defendant “must show that its legitimate reason, stand-
ing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision”). Under Price Waterhouse, such 
a showing fully exempted the defendant from liability. See id. This part of the decision, 
however, was short-lived. Two years later, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
which severely limited the remedies available to a Title VII plaintiff but stopped short of 
immunizing the defendant from liability. See Harris v City of Santa Monica, 294 P3d 49, 
57 (Cal 2013), quoting 42 USC § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B): 
[W]hen an individual “proves a violation” of Title VII and the [defendant] shows 
it “would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible moti-
vating factor,” a court can “grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . . , and 
attorney’s fees and costs” directly attributable to the Title VII claim but “shall 
not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, 
hiring, promotion, or payment. . . .” 
See also Husman, 12 Cal App 5th at 1184 (citing Harris with approval and noting that 
mixed-motives cases are not infrequent). 
74 214 F3d 213 (1st Cir 2000). 
75 Id at 214. 
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Rosa brought an ECOA suit against the bank, claiming that the 
requirement to conform to gender stereotypes was a form of sex 
discrimination. The district court granted the bank’s motion to dis-
miss.76 Relying on Title VII jurisprudence and Price Waterhouse, 
the First Circuit reversed.77 It held that Rosa had a valid cause of 
action if the bank treated “a woman who dresses like a man dif-
ferently than a man who dresses like a woman.”78 Such disparate 
treatment based on gender stereotyping would be considered 
discrimination on a prohibited basis: sex. By contrast, if the loan 
officer refused Rosa because the loan officer thought Rosa was 
gay, Rosa would have no federal cause of action.79 The ECOA—
like the FH Act and other titles of the Civil Rights Act—does not 
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.80 
The sexual orientation defense carries a number of perverse 
consequences. First, it may help explain why discriminatory inci-
dents are under-reported. The reason is that the defense allows 
defendants to put the sexual orientation of the plaintiff on trial—
even when the plaintiff’s case relies solely on protected bases and 
even if the plaintiff is not a member of the LGBT81 community. 
For example, the black plaintiff who sues a lender for racial dis-
crimination may worry that she will need to defend herself 
against the claim that her perceived sexual orientation was the 
real reason for the discrimination. As a result, plaintiffs who have 
a valid cause of action may avoid litigating in the first place. This 
76 Id. 
77 Id at 216. 
78 Rosa, 214 F3d at 215–16, citing Price Waterhouse, 490 US at 251 (“stereotyped 
remarks [including statements about dressing more ‘femininely’] can certainly be evidence 
that gender played a part.”). 
79 Rosa, 214 F3d at 215–16. The court reviewed the following possibilities: 
[1] It is reasonable to infer that Brunelle [the loan officer] told Rosa to go home 
and change because she thought that Rosa’s attire did not accord with his male 
gender. . . . If so, the Bank concedes, Rosa may have a claim. . . . [2] It is also 
reasonable to infer, though, that Brunelle refused to give Rosa the loan applica-
tion because she thought he was gay, confusing sexual orientation with cross-
dressing. If so, Rosa concedes, our precedents dictate that he would have no re-
course under the federal Act. . . . [3] It is reasonable to infer, as well, that 
Brunelle simply could not ascertain whether the person shown in the identifica-
tion card photographs was the same person that appeared before her that day. 
If this were the case, Rosa again would be out of luck. . . . [4] [F]inally [ ] Brunelle 
may have had mixed motives, some of which fall into the prohibited category. 
Id (citations omitted). Accordingly, the case was remanded to allow the parties to develop 
the evidence. Id. 
80 See id. 
 81 Our focus is on members of the LGB community. See note 3. However, we refer to 
LGBT individuals when the discussion is also relevant to transgender individuals. 
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is true for all types of victims, including heterosexual applicants 
who belong to a protected class. 
Second, LGB individuals who do not feel comfortable disclos-
ing their sexual orientation may avoid filing discrimination suits 
for fear that they will be outed or simply because they do not feel 
comfortable putting their sexual orientation on trial. 
Third, LGB individuals who are willing to disclose (or avoid 
hiding) their sexual orientation should think twice. If they do dis-
close their sexual orientation, they increase the risk that a court 
will treat their sex stereotyping claims as masking meritless sex-
ual orientation allegations. Dawson v Bumble & Bumble,82 a case 
involving an openly lesbian employee, is such an example. The 
court was concerned that the plaintiff was merely trying to use a 
gender stereotyping claim to “bootstrap protection for sexual ori-
entation into [the statute].”83 It explained that “[w]hen utilized by 
an avowedly homosexual plaintiff [ ] gender stereotyping claims 
can easily present problems for an adjudicator.”84 The Dawson 
court solved the “problem”—a suit filed by a LGB plaintiff—by 
dismissing the case. By contrast, in Centola v Potter85 the plaintiff 
“never disclosed his sexual orientation to anyone at work.”86 
Based on this repeated and much-emphasized fact,87 the court 
concluded that the discrimination suffered by the Centola plaintiff 
was likely based on gender stereotypes. This conclusion led the 
court to reject the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.88 
82 398 F3d 211 (2d Cir 2005). 
83 Id at 218 (citation omitted), overruled by Zarda, 883 F3d 100. 
84 Dawson, 398 F3d at 218. For other Title VII decisions accepting the defendant’s 
sexual orientation discrimination defense, see Vickers v Fairfield Medical Center, 453 F3d 
757, 763 (6th Cir 2006) (citing Dawson with approval); Simonton v Runyon, 232 F3d 33, 
35–38 (2d Cir 2000) (en banc) (noting that the “[plaintiff]’s sexual orientation was known 
to his co-workers” and holding that Price Waterhouse’s sex stereotyping theory “would not 
bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men 
are stereotypically feminine, and not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine”), 
overruled by Zarda, 883 F3d 100; Ayala-Sepulveda v Municipality of San German, 661 F 
Supp 2d 130, 137 (D PR 2009) (citing Simonton with approval). 
85 183 F Supp 2d 403 (D Mass 2002). 
86 Id at 410. 
87 The court noted four separate times that the plaintiff did not reveal his sexual 
orientation at work. Id at 407, 410, 412. 
 88 See id at 410. But see Dandan v Radisson Hotel Lisle, 2000 WL 336528, *4 (ND 
Ill) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that, “if the co-workers do not know his sexual orienta-
tion, the verbal abuse can only be attributed to the fact that he is a man” and explaining 
that “whether [defendant’s] co-workers knew or only suspected what his sexual orientation 
is makes no difference” because discrimination based on sexual orientation, real or per-
ceived, is not actionable under Title VII). Still, disclosing the fact that one is a member of 
the LGB community may increase the likelihood not only of facing discrimination but also 
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Dawson and Centola highlight a real concern. In many cases, 
it is impossible to separate sexual orientation discrimination 
claims from sex stereotyping claims. Recognizing this difficulty, 
courts often refer to the line between sexual orientation and sex 
stereotypes as one that is “hardly clear,”89 “difficult to draw,”90 one 
that “does not exist,”91 and is “illogical and artificial.”92 “[S]tereo-
types about homosexuality,” they explain, are simply too “related 
to our stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women.”93 
This difficulty has led many courts to outright reject gender ste-
reotyping discrimination claims for fear that they are framed to 
mask a sexual orientation discrimination claim.94 Dawson was re-
cently overruled by Zarda, which extended Title VII protections 
to victims of sexual orientation discrimination, but its reasoning 
may apply in jurisdictions that have yet to join or have rejected 
the trend. In such jurisdictions, the teaching of cases like Dawson 
and Centola is that LGB applicants who want to avoid that fate 
should hide their true sexual orientation. The concern is broader. 
Because the test focuses on “perceived” sexual orientation, all ap-
plicants might have the incentive to conform to societal expecta-
tions concerning gender stereotypes. 
By contrast, LGB applicants whose sexual orientation is 
known to the loan officer may be pressured to adopt mannerisms 
stereotypically associated with the opposite sex (for example, a 
homosexual male may want to wear women’s clothing or act fem-
ininely). If they do not, they run the risk that any future claim 
of discrimination will be easily dismissed (because sexual orien-
tation discrimination is permissible while gender stereotyping 
discrimination is not). 
To see this, consider the following example: A married gay 
male with a perfect credit score enters a bank and fills out a mort-
 
that a court would dismiss one’s sex discrimination claim in jurisdictions that have not 
followed Hively and Zarda. 
89 Centola, 183 F Supp 2d at 408. 
 90 Prowel v Wise Business Forms, 579 F3d 285, 291 (3d Cir 2009) (vacating the lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment and “holding that [the plaintiff’s] sex discrimination 
claim was an artfully-pleaded claim of sexual orientation discrimination” because its 
analysis of “the facts and inferences in favor of [the plaintiff] leads [to the conclusion] that 
the record is ambiguous on this dispositive question”). 
91 Philpott, 252 F Supp 3d at 317. 
92 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
93 Centola, 183 F Supp 2d at 410. 
94 As we explain, this trend is changing. See notes 23–27, 248–49, and accompanying 
text. 
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gage application. The loan officer is aware of the fact that the ap-
plicant is gay—perhaps because the applicant submitted a mar-
riage certificate during the application process. Based solely on 
the applicant’s sexual orientation, the loan officer rejects the 
application. 
If the gay male applicant appears to be stereotypically mascu-
line, he may have a hard time showing that he was discriminated 
against on the basis of a protected characteristic. By contrast, a gay 
male who fails to conform to stereotypes associated with his gender 
(for example, if he wears women’s clothing or appears to be effem-
inate) will likely have an easier time stating a prima facie claim. 
The reason is that “cases applying Price Waterhouse have inter-
preted it as applying where gender non-conformance is demonstra-
ble through the plaintiff’s appearance or behavior.”95 Thus, unless 
the plaintiff can prove that “his appearance or mannerisms . . . 
were perceived as gender non-conforming in some way,” his action 
is destined to fail.96 In the above example, the applicant’s case is 
more likely to succeed if he wears what is considered women’s 
clothing even if he prefers not to. Behaving in such a gender non-
conforming manner against one’s natural tendencies, however de-
meaning and ludicrous, has another strategic benefit. It shifts the 
burden to the defendant to show that its motive was based solely 
on the applicant’s perceived sexual orientation. 
Another perverse outcome—a slight variant of the one de-
scribed immediately above—relates to the role of gender-based 
stereotypes. Under Price Waterhouse, discrimination based on 
such stereotypes is illegal sex discrimination. As a result, discrim-
inating against a woman who walks, talks, and dresses like a man 
is prohibited. But if a loan officer instead relies on such stereo-
types to infer that the applicant is homosexual and then discrim-
inates solely on the basis of homosexuality, the discrimination is 
not actionable in most jurisdictions. 
To illustrate, consider again the male applicant with a perfect 
credit score whose application was denied because the loan officer 
believed he was gay, perhaps because the loan officer thought he 
seemed effeminate. If the lender cites the applicant’s (perceived) 
sexual orientation as the reason for denying the application and 
95 Vickers, 453 F3d at 763 (6th Cir 2006). 
 96 Id (emphasis added). See also Dawson, 398 F3d at 221 (holding that “one can fail to 
conform to gender stereotypes in two ways: (1) through behavior or (2) through appearance” 
and dismissing the complaint after noting that the “[plaintiff] makes no assertion with re-
spect to behavioral non-conformance”) (emphasis added), overruled by Zarda, 883 F3d 100. 
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can prove that sexual orientation was the sole basis for the denial, 
the lender will not be liable for the discrimination. The sexual 
orientation discrimination defense, therefore, allows a loan officer 
to rely on gender stereotypes to inform the lender’s belief that the 
applicant is gay and then permissibly discriminate against that 
applicant because he appears gay, despite Price Waterhouse’s pro-
hibition against discrimination based on gender stereotypes. 
Finally, the sexual orientation defense likely dilutes the pro-
tection afforded to transgender applicants against gender identity 
discrimination. In cases in which the gender identity of the appli-
cant visibly “transgresses gender stereotypes,”97 the lender may 
have an easier time raising the sexual orientation defense. As 
Dawson and Centola suggest, in these cases, transgender appli-
cants are more likely to have their day in court if they hide their 
transgender identities. Thus, the law not only allows discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation but also incentivizes applicants 
to hide their true gender identity or sexual orientation in some 
cases and misrepresent them in others. 
In sum, with the exception of the Equal Access Rule, federal 
law does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination when it 
comes to mortgage lending. Rather, it views sexual orientation as 
a “legitimate” (if abhorrent) basis for discrimination. The result 
may be under-reporting of all types of discriminatory incidents, 
more discrimination, and a myriad of perverse outcomes. Both the 
FH Act98 and ECOA,99 however, left the door open for state and 
local legislatures to provide broader protection. As the next 
Section explains, however, the majority of states and local juris-
dictions have forgone the opportunity. 
C. State and Local Laws 
Although all states have enacted fair housing laws, only 
twenty-three states include a provision prohibiting sexual orien-
tation discrimination in lending. Twenty of these states also pro-
hibit gender identity discrimination. Table 1 lists the states that 
 97 Glenn, 663 F3d at 1316. See also Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 at *9 (“A person is de-
fined as transgender precisely because of the perception that [their] behavior transgresses 
gender stereotypes.”). 
 98 42 USC § 3615 (stating that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to 
invalidate or limit any law of a State or political subdivision”). 
 99 15 USC § 1691d(f) (“This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any 
person subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with, the laws of any 
State with respect to credit discrimination, except to the extent that those laws are incon-
sistent with any provision of this subchapter.”). 
22 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1 
enacted fair housing laws prohibiting gender identity and/or sexual 
orientation discrimination, including the enactment and effective 
dates of the relevant statutes. Finally, two states, Arkansas and 
Tennessee, forbid their localities from adopting ordinances that 
would prohibit discrimination on a basis not recognized by the 
state.100 The result is that the same discriminatory behavior may 
be allowed in some states but not in others. Moreover, even in 
those states that do not prohibit discrimination in lending against 
members of the LGB community, discrimination may be prohib-
ited in certain localities and counties. As Figure 1 below illus-
trates, the annual increase in the number of such political subdi-
visions sharply increased in 2010 and reached its highest point in 
2013—the year following the enactment of the Equal Access Rule. 
100 See note 9 and accompanying text. 
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TABLE 1:  STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS IN LENDING101 
State 
Sexual Orientation Gender Identity 
Passed Effective Passed Effective 
CA 10/10/1999 10/10/1999* 09/06/2011 01/01/2012 
CO 05/29/2008 05/29/2008 05/22/2014 08/06/2014 
CT 05/01/1991 09/01/1993 07/01/2011 10/01/2011 
DE 07/02/2009 07/02/2009 06/19/2013 06/19/2013 
DC 12/13/1977 12/13/1977* 12/22/2005 03/08/2006 
HI 07/11/2005 07/11/2005 07/11/2005 07/11/2005 
IL 01/21/2005 01/01/2006 01/21/2005 01/01/2006 
IA 05/05/2007 05/05/2007 05/05/2007 05/05/2007 
ME 03/28/2012 09/01/2012 03/28/2012 09/01/2012 
MD 05/15/2001 01/01/2001 05/15/2014 10/01/2014 
MA 11/15/1989 11/15/1989 11/23/2011 07/01/2012 
MN 04/02/1993 04/02/1993 04/02/1993 04/02/1993 
NV 06/01/2011 06/01/2011 06/01/2011 06/01/2011 
NJ 01/19/1992 01/19/1992 12/19/2006 06/17/2007 
NM 04/08/2003 07/01/2003 04/08/2003 07/01/2003 
OR 05/09/2007 01/01/2008 05/09/2007 01/01/2008 
RI 05/22/1995 05/22/1995 07/13/2001 07/13/2001 
UT 03/12/2015 05/12/2015 03/12/2015 05/12/2015 
VT 04/23/1992 04/23/1992* 05/22/2007 07/01/2007 
WA 01/31/2006 06/08/2006 01/31/2006 06/08/2006 
NH 06/09/1997 01/01/1998 - - 
NY 12/17/2002 01/16/2003 - - 
WI 03/02/1981 03/02/1981* - - 
 101 The asterisks denote that California, the District of Columbia, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin did not specify an effective date, and we assumed it was the same as the enact-
ment date. 
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FIGURE 1:  THE NUMBER OF NEW LOCAL-LEVEL PROTECTIONS 
AGAINST SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN 
JURISDICTIONS WITHOUT STATE-LEVEL PROTECTION102 
D. An Under-studied Phenomenon 
Of the very few studies that investigate sexual orientation 
discrimination, only two focus on the mortgage lending market.103 
As we explain below, these studies were limited in nature. The 
first was a field experiment that was conducted in one state 
(Michigan), before the enactment of the Equal Access Rule, and 
had only 120 observations, of which only thirty-six focused on home 
financing.104 The second, written concurrently with this Article, 
was empirical in nature.105 This study treated all same-sex cou-
ples as one homogenous group, it focused on all mortgages (not 
just FHA loans), and it ignored the effect of state and local laws 
on acceptance rates. Importantly, due to their design, these stud-
ies could not provide—not even anecdotally—answers to the ques-
tions we investigate here. This Section begins with a short over-
view of the economics of discrimination. It then reviews the 
leading studies on sexual orientation discrimination and the 
shortcomings of their designs. 
 102 This data about local level protections was collected using a number of databases, 
including Municode, Code Publishing, American Legal Publishing, General Code Corporation, 
Qcode, Coded Systems, and Conway Greene. See note 185. 
103 These studies are discussed in Part I.D.3. 
104 See notes 149–63 and accompanying text; Michigan Study (cited in note 16). 
105 See notes 156–59 and accompanying text. See generally Gao and Sun, The Rainbow 
of Credit (cited in note 17). 
2019] Empirical Analysis of Sexual Orientation Discrimination 25 
1. The economics of discrimination.
Discrimination in the home mortgage lending process is a 
topic that has received considerable attention both from aca-
demics and policymakers. In his seminal book, The Economics 
of Discrimination,106 Professor Gary Becker provided a basis for 
much of the theoretical work on discrimination.107 According to 
Becker, some individuals act as though they have a “taste,” or 
preference, for discrimination against a minority group.108 But 
discrimination comes at a cost: forgoing profitable transactions 
with members of the discriminated group.109 
Theory predicts that in a competitive market, this cost will 
drive out taste-based discrimination.110 For example, an employer 
who prefers to hire only white employees forgoes the benefits that 
talented nonwhite employees may bring. Those employees may be 
hired by other firms and possibly at a lower than average salary. 
As a result, nondiscriminating firms may be able to offer better 
products or services at a lower price and consequently drive the 
discriminating firm out of the market.111 In the mortgage lending 
context, the cost of discriminating can also be prohibitive. Reject-
ing applicants with good credit because they belong to a certain 
group may result in fewer profits and a reduction in value. This 
is the case, for example, if the prejudicial lender reaches a point 
at which sales made to his preferred groups are exhausted. At 
that point, the prejudicial lender must either offer loans to all in-
dividuals or incur losses. Charging supracompetitive prices to 
106 Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago 2d ed 1971). 
107 Id at 14–15. 
108 See Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 17–19 (Chicago 
1976). The reason for discrimination may also be the preference of a third party who is in a 
position to penalize those who decline to discriminate. See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, 
Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 Cal L Rev 751, 754 (1991) (providing as examples “the 
case of a shopkeeper whose customers do not like dealing with blacks or women, a com-
mercial airline whose patrons react unfavorably to female pilots, a law firm whose clients 
prefer not to have black lawyers, [and] a hospital whose patients are uncomfortable with 
female doctors or black nurses” and noting that, “[i]n [ ] these cases, an employer who 
introduces norms of equality into the work force will be punished, not rewarded”). 
109 Becker, Economic Approach to Human Behavior at 13–14 (cited in note 108). 
110 See id at 35–37. 
111 See id. See also Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 340–41 (Princeton 
2000); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L J 1, 92–96 (1992) (reviewing 
the Becker model and offering an alternative theory of discrimination, claiming that dis-
crimination may be the result of competition over social status between groups). 
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members of a protected group (for example, reverse redlining112) 
is also infeasible if enough lenders are willing to offer credit.113 
Markets, however, are not always competitive, and as a result, 
taste-based discrimination may persist.114 
A different theory that explains why discrimination may per-
sist in competitive markets, and can even be efficient, is statisti-
cal discrimination, meaning discrimination that arises out of a 
risk assessment based on characteristics commonly held by that 
group.115 Under this theory, firms do not discriminate because 
they have a taste for discrimination. Rather, in a world of imper-
fect information, these firms resort to group characteristics or ste-
reotypes as proxies to evaluate outcome-relevant attributes of in-
dividuals. In other words, these firms make the inference that, 
because an individual belongs to a certain group, she possesses 
certain traits associated with that group. “In the classic textbook 
example, if employers believe (correctly) that workers belonging 
to a minority group perform, on average, worse than dominant 
group workers do, then the employers’ rational response is to 
treat [the two groups of workers] differently.”116 Another example 
is the use of a sex stereotype as a proxy in labor markets. Based 
on past experience, an employer may believe that, compared to 
men, women are more likely to leave their jobs during childbear-
ing years. The behavior is rational and (likely) profit-maximizing 
 112 See United Companies Lending Corp v Sargeant, 20 F Supp 2d 192, 203 n 5 (D 
Mass 1998) (“Redlining is the practice of denying the extension of credit to specific geo-
graphic areas due to the income, race, or ethnicity of its residents. . . . Reverse redlining 
is the practice of extending credit on unfair terms to those same communities.”). 
 113 See Gary A. Dymski, Discrimination in the Credit and Housing Markets: Findings 
and Challenges, in William M. Rodgers III, ed, Handbook on the Economics of Discrimination 
215, 220 (Edward Elgar 2006) (noting that the effects of racial preferences in a market 
depend on “the freedom of market entry, and on whether market participants face trans-
action and/or information costs”). 
 114 See Gary A. Dymski, The Theory of Credit-Market Redlining and Discrimination: 
An Exploration, 23 Rev Black Political Economy 43–45 (Winter 1995) (explaining that dis-
crimination may occur if the number of prejudicial lenders is large enough to dictate the 
price to the neutral lenders); Cooter, The Strategic Constitution at 344 (cited in note 111) 
(explaining that collusion by social groups can result in market power). 
 115 See Kenneth Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in Orley Ashenfelter and 
Albert Rees, eds, Discrimination in Labor Markets 23–24 (Princeton 1973); Edmund S. 
Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Am Econ Rev 659, 660 (1972); 
Devin G. Pope and Justin R. Sydnor, What’s in a Picture? Evidence of Discrimination from 
Prosper.com, 46 J of Hum Res 53, 53 (Winter 2011) (“Accurate statistical discrimination is 
economically efficient for the decision maker, while taste-based discrimination stems from 
an animus toward one group and is often costly to the decision-maker.”). 
 116 Hanmin Fang and Andrea Moro, Theories of Statistical Discrimination and 
Affirmative Action: A Survey, in Jess Benhabib, ed, 1A Handbook of Social Economics 135 
(Elsevier 2011). 
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even when the decisionmaker relies on proxies that are “over-
broad generalizations and far from entirely accurate.”117 
Redlining—the practice of denying services or raising prices 
to minority groups—can be the result of such statistical discrimi-
nation.118 Just like employers may rely on sex and race as proxies 
for performance,119 a lender may rely on similar proxies to esti-
mate risk. As a result, what might appear to be systematic taste-
based discrimination against a minority group may in fact simply 
be lenders avoiding loans in high-crime, low-income areas that 
happen to be heavily populated by the minority group. Econo-
mists refer to this form of discrimination as “statistical.” It is also 
referred to as rational discrimination,120 and some have argued 
that rational discrimination should be legally permitted.121 
There are, of course, other theories of discrimination.122 Our 
goal here is not to review every possible theory. Rather, following 
the empirical literature, we focus on the taste-based and statisti-
cal discrimination theories.123 This focus allows us to reveal and 
propose new ways to deal with some of the flaws that plague pre-
vious studies. It also allows us to shed new light on and challenge 
their findings and conclusions. Finally, these two theories have 
another benefit: they interact differently with the Contact 
Hypothesis,124 a theory we test. Under this theory, discrimination 
may be the result of ignorance and, accordingly, can be reduced 
 117 Sunstein, 79 Cal L Rev at 755–56 (cited in note 108) (noting that “race or sex in 
some contexts may be every bit as accurate a predictor of job performance as, say, test 
scores, education, and previous employment” and that, “in some cases, reliance on more 
direct and individualized devices might be too costly to be worthwhile”).  
118 See United Companies, 20 F Supp 2d at 203 n 5. 
119 See Sunstein, 79 Cal L Rev at 755–57 (cited in note 108). 
120 See Jack M. Guttentag and Susan M. Wachter, Redlining and Public Policy 11–
12 (NYU 1980). 
 121 See, for example, id at 40–42 (saying that, because most redlining is rational, the 
costs of implementing antiredlining regulations do not justify the benefits.). 
 122 See, for example, McAdams, 102 Yale L J at 91–96 (cited in note 111) (explaining 
that discrimination may be the result of competition over social status between groups). 
 123 For studies drawing similar distinctions, see Lauster and Easterbrook, 58 Soc 
Probs at 391 (cited in note 14) (studying sexual orientation discrimination in the Canadian 
rental market); Uri Gneezy, John List, and Michael K. Price, Toward an Understanding 
of Why People Discriminate: Evidence from a Series of Natural Field Experiments *12–13 
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 17855, Feb 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6LAW-U9M8 (studying discrimination in a number of service and product 
markets related to the automobile industry); Pope and Sydnor, 46 J Hum Res at 55–56 
(cited in note 115) (studying discrimination in peer-to-peer lending markets). 
 124 See Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 281 (Addison-Wesley 1954); 
Richard Delgado, et al, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis L Rev 1359, 1382; Lauster and Easterbrook, 58 
Soc Probs at 391 (cited in note 14). 
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by contact with members of the minority group. If true, the em-
pirical prediction is that areas with more intergroup contact ex-
perience less discrimination. The prediction holds when the dis-
crimination is taste-based. By contrast, contact with minorities 
may reinforce statistical discrimination if it provides the deci-
sionmaker with new proxies that will allow it to segment the mar-
ket. For example, a lender who learns that members of a certain 
minority group suffer from a higher unemployment rate may re-
fuse to sell them loans or require higher interest rates.125 If the 
lender learns through contact that certain groups are less likely 
to bargain, the lender may attempt to command higher prices. 
With these two theories in mind—taste-based and statistical dis-
crimination—we now turn to the world of practice. 
2. Two types of studies: the econometric approach and field
experiments.
Attempts to empirically address taste-based and statistical 
discrimination have essentially taken two forms: (a) the econo-
metric approach and (b) field studies. As we explain below, these 
studies suffer from a number of theoretical and methodological 
limitations. Understanding the criticism these studies faced and 
the methodologies they used not only motivates and informs our 
study but also allows us to extend the literature on discrimination 
in mortgage lending to discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
a) The econometric approach. The first approach is to main-
tain data at the individual level and assess the likelihood of loan 
acceptance. This is an attractive approach because lenders typi-
cally have guidelines and algorithms that drive the loan ac-
ceptance process. In a leading study, researchers were able to ob-
tain all the data associated with whether a loan should have been 
accepted or denied.126 They were thus able to control for every fac-
tor that, according to the banks, was a relevant consideration. The 
study concluded that an application from a black or Hispanic indi-
vidual was 8.2 percentage points less likely to be approved than an 
application filed by a white individual with similar bank-relevant 
 125 See generally Stephen L. Ross and Margery Austin Turner, Housing Discrimination 
in Metropolitan America: Explaining Changes between 1989 and 2000, 52 Soc Probs 152 
(2005) (suggesting that a landlord may discriminate against members of a minority group 
based on such information). 
 126 See Alicia H. Munnell, et al, Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA 
Data, 86 Am Econ Rev 25, 32 (1996). 
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characteristics.127 Follow-up studies questioned the sensitivity of 
this result and argued that, if anything, it applies only to appli-
cations right on the fringe of acceptance.128 Others argued that the 
single most important factor to a loan application—risk of loan 
default—is not adequately considered.129 
The criticism that received possibly the most attention was 
that this type of modeling did not address the source of the dis-
crimination, such as whether it was the result of taste-based or 
statistical discrimination.130 That is, was the observed discrimi-
nation evidence of bigotry? Or was race just a proxy for some other 
neighborhood characteristic associated with the typical black ap-
plication that lenders might rationally want to avoid? Later stud-
ies attempted to answer the motivation question by aggregating 
the data away from the individual level to the neighborhood level. 
These studies found much weaker evidence of racial (taste-based) 
redlining. 
As we discuss below,131 we are able to address each of the con-
cerns brought up by the racial redlining literature—specifically 
that traditional techniques fail to disentangle race effects from 
neighborhood effects—in a number of ways available to us, 
thanks to the thoroughness of the HMDA data.132 By doing so, our 
study is not only the first to use regression-based analysis to 
study sexual orientation discrimination, but it also invites and 
sets the ground for future research. 
127 See id at 33. 
 128 See Raphael W. Bostic, The Role of Race in Mortgage Lending: Revisiting the 
Boston Fed Study *19–21 (Federal Reserve Board of Governors Division of Research & 
Statistics Working Paper, Dec 1996) (on file with authors). See generally Judith A. Clarke, 
Nilanjana Roy, and Marsha J. Courchane, On the Robustness of Racial Discrimination 
Findings in Mortgage Lending Studies, 41 Applied Econ 2279 (2009). 
129 See Peter Brimelow and Leslie Spencer, The Hidden Clue, Forbes (Jan 4, 1993) 
(suggesting that the observation used by Professor Alicia Munnell to justify discounting 
differences in default rates between races—the fact that there were no differences in de-
fault rates across census tracts that were populated by different racial groups—was recur-
sive insofar as the minority borrowers in those census tracts had presumably already been 
filtered through a lender who predicted higher default rates among minorities). 
 130 See Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Redlining in Boston: Do Mortgage Lenders Discriminate 
against Neighborhoods?, 111 Q J Econ 1049, 1050–51 (1996). 
131 See Parts II.A–B. 
 132 For example, we are able to limit the possibility of statistical discrimination by 
restricting the dataset to only FHA loans. Once issued, these loans carry the same risk to 
the bank regardless of any underlying characteristic that banks think they may need to 
account for that is associated with race, or sexual orientation. We also compare changes 
in lending rates by minority groups from the same bank in the same county. 
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b) Field experiments. With very limited ability to obtain data
on the individual level, “[m]uch of the research into housing dis-
crimination, including HUD’s [Housing Discrimination Studies],” 
had to resort to “paired testing.”133 Under this methodology, “two 
testers assume the role of applicants with equivalent social and 
economic characteristics who differ only in terms of the charac-
teristic being tested for discrimination, such as race, disability 
status, or marital status.”134 
While most studies focus on racial discrimination in mort-
gage lending,135 only a few attempted to investigate sexual orien-
tation discrimination. The first field experiment was conducted in 
Sweden in 2009 and found evidence of discrimination against 
same-sex couples.136 The authors sent out two fictitious applica-
tions for rental housing via the internet. One application was sent 
by a couple with a traditionally male and female name. The other 
application was sent by two distinctively male names, suggesting 
a gay couple. Each pair also presented itself as a “couple” to ex-
plicitly signal their sexual orientation. The authors then meas-
ured the rate at which each fictitious couple was called back. They 
found that, compared to the heterosexual couple, the homosexual 
couple was 14 percentage points less likely to receive a callback.137 
A follow-up study carried out in much the same manner—email 
correspondence studies—found similar results in the Vancouver, 
Canada rental market.138 
These two studies established some initial evidence of the 
possibility of discrimination based on sexual orientation, but they 
 133 Pair Testing and the Housing Discrimination Studies (Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, Spring/Summer 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/652L-CVE6. 
134 Id. 
 135 See, for example, Lauster and Easterbrook, 58 Soc Probs at 390 (cited in note 14) 
(“Much has been written about discrimination in the rental market, but the literature is 
almost entirely focused on race and ethnicity.”). 
136 See Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 76 Economica at 595 (cited in note 14) (“These re-
sults reveal that homosexual males were discriminated [against] since the homosexual 
couple in the study got fewer call-backs, fewer invitations to further contacts and fewer 
invitations to showings than the heterosexual couple.”). 
137 See id at 594. 
 138 See Lauster and Easterbrook, 58 Soc Probs at 403 (cited in note 14). The author 
found that, compared to the heterosexual baseline, male couples were 24 percent less 
likely to receive a positive response to a rental inquiry. By contrast, lesbian couples were 
actually more likely to receive a positive response to rental inquiries than the heterosexual 
couple, though the effect was statistically insignificant. Id. The study also found support 
for the Contact Theory. In areas where individuals were more likely to have contact or 
familiarity with same-sex couples (for example, downtown), landlords “demonstrate[d] 
much less discrimination against same-sex male couples.” (The authors noted, however, 
that these areas were also the more expensive ones.) See id. 
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have their limitations. Because each study focuses on a specific 
area and addresses only rentals, we hesitate to draw too much of 
a conclusion about how these results might translate to mortgage 
approval rates. This is especially so because antidiscrimination 
laws differ from one country to another, as do social norms. 
A broader concern is whether correspondence studies, which 
rely on response rates to email inquiries, can serve as a proper 
measure of discrimination. To begin with, such studies struggle 
to distinguish between taste-based and statistical discrimination 
because the underlying motivation for the housing denial is not 
known to the researcher and because the audit nature of these 
studies usually prohibits the use of neighborhood fixed effects. 
The distinction is critical, as different forms of discrimination call 
for different remedies and measures. Moreover, it is also unclear 
if the response rate can serve as a proxy for discrimination at all. 
The Swedish and Canadian studies exemplify the problem with 
the methodology. In both, a nonresponse was considered a nega-
tive outcome and a sign of discrimination.139 By contrast, all re-
sponses were considered nondiscriminatory outcomes even 
though there are many ways bigoted landlords can mask discrim-
ination through a response. Examples are email replies that raise 
difficulties of actually seeing the apartment140 and responses that 
redirect the applicant to a different property owner—both of 
which happened in the Vancouver study.141 It is also likely that 
some prejudicial landlords provide untruthful responses regard-
ing occupancy. These responses might be strong evidence of ac-
tual discrimination, but they were considered a nondiscrimina-
tory outcome. 
Another major challenge is whether the results, even if taken 
as valid, can be generalized. How much can a study in Sweden or 
Vancouver tell us about housing discrimination generally in the 
United States? In an effort to answer the question, HUD commis-
sioned a similar email correspondence study.142 Touted as the 
139 See id at 398; Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 76 Economica at 592 (cited in note 14). 
 140 For example, a discriminating landlord could, hypothetically, respond positively 
to the inquiry from the homosexual couple but make it difficult for the couple to actually 
see the apartment. Examples of this in practice may look like scheduling a visit multiple 
weeks out at an inconvenient time or requesting a phone conversation to confirm a date 
and time to tour the facility and never answering the phone. 
141 See Lauster and Easterbrook, 58 Soc Probs at 402 (cited in note 14). 
142 Samantha Friedman, et al, An Estimate of Housing Discrimination against Same-
Sex Couples *2 (Department of Housing and Urban Development, June 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5KXM-T6YZ. Although the HUD study was conducted in 2011 before the 
Equal Access Rule was promulgated, it was released to the public in July 2013. 
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“first large-scale [ ] study to assess housing discrimination 
against same-sex couples”143 on a “national scale,”144 the 2011 
study conducted 6,833 paired email-correspondence tests across 
fifty randomly selected markets. The study found that, compared 
to heterosexual couples, same-sex couples—both male and fe-
male—received significantly fewer responses as compared to heter-
osexual couples.145 There was also some evidence that jurisdictions 
with state-level prohibitions against sexual orientation discrimina-
tion exhibited slightly more adverse treatment against same-sex 
couples compared with states without such prohibitions.146 
The recent HUD study represents a new and improved gen-
eration of field experiments. Together with a recent study con-
ducted in the automobile industry, it indicates that sexual orien-
tation discrimination permeates many markets.147 But what the 
HUD and other studies did not and could not test is how sex and 
race interact. The automobile study included only white male test-
ers, and in the HUD study, “the only difference between the two 
e-mails was whether the couple was same sex or heterosexual.”148 
3. Sexual orientation in mortgage lending.
To date, only two studies have addressed sexual orientation 
discrimination in mortgage lending. The first study (Michigan 
Study) was conducted in 2007 by four of Michigan’s Fair Housing 
Centers and included 120 pair-tests.149 Each test included two 
pairs: one posing as a heterosexual couple and the other posing 
as a same-sex couple with superior credentials (“higher income, 
larger down payment, and better credit”).150 The study found dis-
parate treatment in 32 (27 percent) of the 120 tests and concluded 
143 Id at *iv. 
144 Id at *6. 
145 See id at *vi (“[H]eterosexual couples were favored over gay male couples in 15.9 
percent of tests and over lesbian couples in 15.6 percent of tests.”). 
146 See Friedman, et al, An Estimate of Housing Discrimination at *iv, vi–vii, 16–17. 
 147 See Gneezy, List, and Price, Toward an Understanding at *16 (cited in note 123) 
(focusing on car dealerships in the Chicago area). 
148 See Friedman, et al, An Estimate of Housing Discrimination at vii (cited in note 
142) (“The study measured the response of housing providers regarding the sexual orien-
tation of couples and did not examine other characteristics.”); Gneezy, List, and Price, 
Toward an Understanding at *17 (cited in note 123). 
 149 For an explanation of the methodology and its limitations, see Pair Testing and 
the Housing Discrimination Studies (cited in note 133) (“Much of the research into housing 
discrimination . . . relies on paired testing, a methodology in which two testers assume the 
role of applicants . . . who differ only in terms of the characteristic being tested for dis-
crimination, such as race.”). 
150 Michigan Study at *3 (cited in note 16). 
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that discrimination against same-sex couples is widespread.151 
The Michigan Study’s conclusion, however, suffers from a number 
of limitations. To begin with, the study focused on only one state: 
Michigan.152 The sample size was also small: a total of 120 paired 
tests.153 Third, the study focused on three markets, of which only 
36 (or 30 percent) of the 120 tests were dedicated to discrimina-
tion in “home financing.”154 Moreover, home financing exhibited 
the least amount of discrimination: 20 percent compared to rental 
(33 percent) and homes sales (25 percent).155 Fourth, the study 
was conducted in 2007, five years before the enactment of the 
Equal Access Rule. At that time, discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation was allowed with respect to all types of mort-
gages, including FHA loans. Therefore, the study could not esti-
mate the effectiveness of the Equal Access Rule. 
The second study, conducted concurrently with ours, made a 
number of important findings.156 First, based on a national sample 
of 20 percent of HMDA data from 1990 to 2015, it found that, 
“compared to otherwise similar loan applicants,” the gross ap-
proval rate for same-sex couples is 3 percent lower.157 Merging the 
HMDA sample with Fannie Mae Performance Data revealed that 
same-sex couples whose applications were accepted were charged 
higher interests expenses at a magnitude of 0.02 to 0.2 percent.158 
At the same time, the authors found no evidence that same-sex 
couples had a higher default risk.159 Professors Lei Gao and Hua 
Sun’s study makes an important contribution. But it is different 
from our study in a number of important respects, which do not 
allow it to answer the questions we investigate here. First, Gao 
and Sun’s study ignores the legal landscape and assumes that 
sexual orientation discrimination is not prohibited. Specifically, 
it ignores the fact that twenty-three states now prohibit sexual 
orientation discrimination in mortgage lending and that, even 
within states that do not prohibit the practice, some localities do. 
As a result, Gao and Sun did not and could not test the impact of 
151 Id at *9–10. 
152 Id. 
153 Id at *9. 
154 Michigan Study at *9 (cited in note 16). 
155 Id at *11. 
156 See generally Gao and Sun, The Rainbow of Credit (cited in note 17). 
157 Id at *4. The rate increased to 8 percent when conducted on the Boston Fed 
Dataset, “which includes an extensive list of property, neighborhood, borrower, and lender 
characteristics for a random sample of borrowers in Boston in 1990.” Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id at *24. 
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state and local rules on acceptance rates. Gao and Sun’s study also 
does not separately measure discrimination by mortgage type. This 
could be potentially important, as FHA mortgages are subject to 
the Equal Access Rule while non-FHA mortgages are not. 
Importantly, both studies were designed to test only one var-
iable: sexual orientation discrimination. For this reason, these 
studies treated all same-sex couples, regardless of their sex 
(male/female) or race (black/white), as one homogeneous group.160 
This design did not allow the authors to test how the interaction 
between sex and race influences the discriminatory practices 
identified.161 Nor could the studies identify the effect of local ordi-
nances162 or determine whether and how “differences between the 
ways lesbians and gay men are treated” impacted the findings.163 
Sun and Gao’s failure to distinguish between same-sex male cou-
ples and same-sex female couples may also explain the low level 
of discrimination found in their study—only 3 percent in the 
HMDA data.164 Our study suggests that same-sex female couples 
are treated at least as favorably (and in some cases more favora-
bly) as heterosexual couples, which implies that the actual rate of 
sexual orientation discrimination against same-sex male couples 
is in fact higher.165 
 160 In the Michigan Study, like in other experiments, in each of the paired tests, the 
couples posing as same-sex couples and heterosexual couples were always of the same 
race. See Michigan Study at *3 (cited in note 16). Of these couples, the vast majority—113 
(or 94 percent)—were white, five were black, and two were inter-racial. See id at *10. Gao 
and Sun controlled for race in their study but did not explore its interaction with sexual 
orientation in this context. See generally Gao and Sun, The Rainbow of Credit (cited in 
note 17). 
 161 See Michigan Study at *9, 11 (cited in note 16) (admitting that “[m]ore testing is 
needed to see how the race and sex of testers [that is, of applicants] are influencing factors 
in some housing markets”). 
 162 See id at *9 (“It is unclear whether [levels of discrimination found across the state 
diverged widely] due to differences in . . . the presence of local ordinances protecting sexual 
orientation.”). Although inconclusive, the Michigan Study reported that there was less ev-
idence of discrimination in areas with such local ordinances (22 percent compared to 30 
percent in areas without ordinances). See id at *16. 
 163 Id at *9. The Swedish, Canadian, and HUD studies also suffer from this limitation. 
See generally Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 76 Economica 588 (cited in note 14). 
164 Gao and Sun, The Rainbow of Credit at *4 (cited in note 17). 
165 See notes 211–12 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE DESIGN, DATA, AND FINDINGS
A. The Design 
Our study is the first attempt to fill the gap and shed light on 
the very issues that the Michigan Study identified as important 
but left unanswered. As this Part explains, unlike the field exper-
iments, we study sexual orientation discrimination in all states, 
using a large number of observations (over five million) and fo-
cusing solely on mortgage lending. Importantly, our study is the 
first to try to investigate how race and sex impact discrimination 
against same-sex applicants. Our data suggests that race is a crit-
ical factor, that lesbians and gay men are treated differently, and 
that state laws may have a real effect on discrimination against 
the LGB community. 
Our study builds on the prior literature in a variety of ways. 
As Part II.B explains, based on the critiques of the use of 
individual-level data, we construct a model that remedies some of 
the problems identified in prior studies. Our model allows us to 
look at the individual effects of potential mortgage discrimina-
tion. It also takes into account the fact that different minority 
groups may self-select into neighborhoods and into mortgage ap-
plications that have a higher risk of default. 
1. Risk considerations.
We take a number of steps to ensure we do not mistake legit-
imate risk considerations (including proxies that lenders may use 
to assess the risk of default, such as income or geographic effects) 
for discrimination. First, and exactly because of the concern that 
different applicants may carry different levels of risk, we focused 
only on FHA loans. Applicants for these loans must meet certain 
predetermined criteria.166 Importantly, for applicants who met 
the criteria, income and credit scores are less important. In the 
eyes of the lender, these FHA loans carry the same level of risk 
because each loan is insured by the federal government.167 This is 
 166 These include the standards promulgated by the CFPB under the Ability-to-Repay 
and Qualified Mortgage Standards under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed 
Reg 35430, 35438–39 (2013), 12 CFR Part 1026, the FHA loan requirements discussed at 
http://www.fhahandbook.com (visited December 17, 2018), and additional requirements 
set by lenders and investors (known as “overlays”). 
167 See notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
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not to say that FHA loans are risk-free. A high delinquency rate168 
can translate into high servicing costs,169 costly regulatory re-
view,170 and sanctions.171 It may also trigger indemnification re-
quirements172 and can result in severe judgments173 and reputa-
tional harm.174 However, there is nothing to suggest that lenders 
believe that same-sex borrowers are more likely to default than 
other borrowers.175 
 
 168 The “serious delinquency rate[ ],” defined as the “sum of 90-day delinquencies plus 
in-foreclosures and in-bankruptcies,” has been steadily reduced in recent years from 15.78 
percent in 2007 to 0.05 percent in 2017. See FHA Single Family Loan Performance Trends 
*2 (Department of Housing and Urban Development, Feb 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/B24F-Y6PU.  
 169 See Laurie S. Goodman, Quantifying the Tightness of Mortgage Credit and 
Assessing Policy Actions, 37 BC J L & Soc Just 235, 246 (2017) (reporting that in 2015 the 
annual cost of servicing performing loans was $181 compared to $2,386 for nonperforming 
loans). 
 170 See 12 USC § 1708(c)(3); 24 CFR § 25.2 (“The Board has the authority to take any 
administrative action against mortgagees and lenders.”); 24 CFR § 25.5 (giving the board 
the power to issue “a letter of reprimand, probation, suspension, or withdrawal; or enter 
into a settlement agreement.”). 
 171 HUD’s Mortgagee Review Board (MRB) “is empowered to initiate the issuance of 
a letter of reprimand, the probation, suspension or withdrawal of any mortgagee found to 
be engaging in activities in violation of [FHA] requirements or the nondiscrimination re-
quirements of the [ECOA], the [FH Act], or Executive Order 11063.” 12 USC § 1708(c)(1). 
See also 24 CFR § 25.5 (detailing the effect of these administrative actions). The MRB is 
also authorized “to impose civil money penalties upon mortgagees and lenders.” See 24 
CFR § 25.2(b)(2); 24 CFR § 30.15; 24 CFR § 30.35(b)–(c)(1) (“Each day that a violation 
continues shall constitute a separate violation” for which “[t]he maximum penalty is 
$9,819 . . . up to a limit of $1,963,870 for all violations committed during any one-year 
period.”). 
 172 See Bernadette Kogler, Ann Schnare, and Tim Willis, Lender Perspectives on 
FHA’s Declining Market Share *25 (Research Institute for Housing America, Aug 2006), 
archived at http://perma.cc/5DCV-RE5H (explaining that HUD can “require a lender to 
‘indemnify’ the department” when the “insured loan [ ] was not originated in compliance 
with FHA guidelines,” and reporting that “interviews revealed that HUD indemnifications 
result from comparatively minor documentation deficiencies that are not necessarily re-
lated to a borrower’s ability or willingness to repay”). 
 173 A major source of concern for lenders is the False Claims Act (FCA), Pub L No 97-
258, 96 Stat 978 (1982), codified as amended at 31 USC § 3729 et seq. The FCA allows the 
government to recover from those who knowingly make a false record or submit a fraudu-
lent claim three times the damages sustained by the government. See 31 USC § 3729(a)(1). 
Because FHA lenders must certify their compliance with HUD’s rules, they are exposed to 
FCA litigation for errors committed during the origination phase. See Goodman, 37 BC J 
L & Soc Just at 245 (cited in note 169) (arguing that “the big issue for FHA servicers is 
the presence of the False Claims Act” and noting that, in 2016, settlements with lenders 
for FCA violations were close to $5 billion). 
 174 See Kolger, Schnare, and Willis, Lender Perspectives at *24–25 (cited in note 172) 
(reporting that, in a study completed by sixty-one lending institutions, negative publicity 
was “cited as a moderate or minimal risk by most respondents”). 
 175 In fact, there is some evidence to the contrary. See, for example, The LGBT Financial 
Experience: 2012–2013 Prudential Research Study *10 (Prudential, 2013), archived at 
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Second, as we explain in the methodology section, while 
HMDA data is limited, we do have and control for the applicant’s 
income. That is, in addition to other controls, we compare loans of 
applicants with the same level of income. 
Finally, we recognize that the neighborhood of the home may 
actually just be a proxy for bad credit (that is, bad economic neigh-
borhoods generally attract applicants with bad credit). To control 
for a “neighborhood effect,” we include county-by-bank fixed ef-
fects, which controls for any differences across neighborhoods and 
banks. We are looking at how different compositions of race and 
gender affect loan acceptance within the same neighborhood by 
the same bank.176 Moreover, while we do not have the credit score 
of the applicant, we do know if the loan got denied because of a 
poor credit score. Thus, while we do not know the intimate details 
of an applicant’s credit history, we do know and control for those 
applicants with bad enough credit to disqualify them for an FHA 
loan. As we explain further below, our empirical design allows us 
to compare loans of similarly situated applicants (same applicant 
income, same loan amount, same loan purpose, same risk to the 
lender, etc.). This design—comparing loan acceptance rates 
within the same county by the same banks with multiple con-
trols—has an important benefit. It offsets the concern that what 
http://perma.cc/RU4W-6MZH (“The LGBT community has a higher median income com-
pared to the general population” and a “high discretionary income, with 40% of gay men 
and 25% of lesbians spending more than $500 a month on discretionary items.”). See also 
Gao and Sun, The Rainbow of Credit at *24 (cited in note 17) (concluding that “same-sex 
status exhibits no greater risk of default,” that “there is no evidence that same-sex bor-
rowers are riskier for lenders, and [that some findings] suggest that it may be the oppo-
site”). Moreover, Gao and Sun find that “HMDA estimation without extensive controls on 
borrower’s characteristics [such as creditworthiness] seems to provide a conservative lower 
bound on the magnitude of lending discrimination to same-sex borrowers.” Id at *4 (em-
phasis added). 
 176 One possible concern could be that county data is not granulated enough to capture 
the self-selection dynamic that may take place in certain neighborhoods within the same 
county. The reason is that some counties have neighborhoods that vary dramatically in 
terms of their default risk. Thus, if same-sex couples are more likely to take a risk on being 
an early entrant into a transitioning neighborhood, they may pose a higher risk to the 
lender, but this may not show in county-level data. Here it is important to note that, while 
our main results are reported using bank-by-county fixed effects, the results are insensi-
tive to using census tract–by–bank fixed effects, which can address such potential selec-
tion effects. We also address this concern (although for a different purpose) by comparing 
mortgages within counties in other regions in the United States—particularly in rural 
counties. In these regions, the concern that there is unobserved variation in risk due to 
self-selection within county is mitigated. We find that the results hold when looking ex-
clusively at rural counties. See note 232 and accompanying text. 
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we measure is actually just a proxy for some other neighborhood-
level characteristic. 
2. The proportion of same-sex gay co-applicants in the
data.
Our design is still disadvantaged by a key element of sexual 
orientation discrimination. Other types of discrimination (for ex-
ample, racial or gender) are typically based on characteristics 
that are easily observed by both the researcher and the lender. By 
contrast, sexual orientation is not a salient characteristic that the 
lender, much less the researcher, can necessarily observe. As a 
result, we do not and cannot directly observe applicants’ sexual 
orientation. While initially this may seem like a fatal flaw in our 
analysis, it is important to remember that the loan officer also 
does not directly observe sexual orientation. The loan officer can 
only infer sexual orientation based on observed characteristics 
(such as the applicant’s style of dress, behavior, etc.) and the per-
ceived relationship between the applicant and co-applicant. While 
we do not (and cannot) observe sexual orientation, we do observe 
one important characteristic: whether the applicant is accompa-
nied by a same-sex co-applicant. This is an important character-
istic that loan officers observe. 
We recognize that this is not a perfect proxy for the appli-
cant’s actual sexual orientation. Indeed, co-applicants can be fam-
ily members (for example, father and son) or friends, to give a few 
examples. However, there is strong theoretical and empirical ev-
idence that our estimates do actually measure sexual orienta-
tion–based discrimination despite our inability to directly distin-
guish between same-sex homosexual co-applicants and same-sex 
heterosexual co-applicants. 
a) Theoretical explanations. First, it is important to remem-
ber that the applicant’s true sexual orientation is irrelevant. Dis-
crimination is not based on the actual sexual orientation of the 
applicant but rather on the applicant’s perceived sexual orienta-
tion. Discrimination is the result of what the loan officer believes 
to be true. By using same-sex co-applicants as a proxy for per-
ceived sexual orientation, we are not only following in the foot-
steps of other researchers;177 we are also following the legal test 
 177 See, for example, Joshua J. Miller and Kevin A. Park, Same-Sex Marriage Laws 
and Demand for Mortgage Credit *8, 20 (Department of Housing and Urban Development 
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established in Price Waterhouse. This test focuses on the plain-
tiff’s “appearance,” “behavior,” and “mannerisms,” as they were 
perceived by the loan officer.178 
Moreover, our findings, if anything, are a conservative meas-
ure of the level of discrimination. The fact that we cannot distin-
guish between (a) same-sex heterosexual co-applicants and 
(b) same-sex gay co-applicants actually makes our results 
stronger. In other words, we show that, if the data includes not 
just gay co-applicants but also heterosexual co-applicants, then 
the true level of discrimination is actually higher than we report. 
The reason is related to the first point: the loan officer cannot 
observe the co-applicants’ true sexual orientation. In some cases, 
the loan officer may have information that we cannot observe: for 
example, whether the same sex co-applicants are a father and 
son. In other cases, the loan officer may believe that the same sex 
co-applicants are a gay couple even if they are not. The concern, 
therefore, is that there are essentially two types of same-sex ap-
plications: (a) those applications in which the co-applicants are 
clearly related, such as a father/son pairing (Group 1), and are 
therefore not (or less likely to be) perceived179 as gay individuals, 
and (b) the rest of the same-sex applications, in which the rela-
tionship between the applicant and co-applicant is ambiguous to 
the lender (Group 2). As researchers, we cannot distinguish be-
tween Group 1 and Group 2. But if (i) the loan officer has a taste 
for discrimination and has additional information on the nature 
of the relationship either through last name or physical appear-
ance (for example, Group 1 looks like a father and son versus 
Group 2, in which it is unclear), and (ii) the loan officer actually 
discriminates only against Group 2, then all that does is under-
state the magnitude of the effect of discrimination. In other 
words, the inability to distinguish between the two groups, if 
anything, biases our results toward zero. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following example. Sup-
pose the bigoted loan officer does not discriminate against 
Group 1 members because he has knowledge that is not observa-
ble to us as researchers. In such a case, members of Group 1 are 
 
Working Paper No HF-020, Feb 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9PFY-FM8R (estimat-
ing, based on the reported sex of co-applicants, that states that passed same-sex marriage 
laws experienced an 8 to 13 percent increase in mortgage applications).  
 178 See notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
 179 A parent and child may both be gay individuals or may be perceived as such by the 
loan officer. It could also be that one of them is a gay individual (that is, the parent or the 
child may be a gay individual). 
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0 percent more/less likely to have the loan approved (that is, they 
will be treated the same as the white heterosexual benchmark). 
Now, because the loan officer is bigoted and does like to discrimi-
nate against Group 2 members (perceived gay co-applicants), those 
loans are, say, 12 percent less likely to get accepted. The “true” 
level of discrimination is 12 percent. However, in our analysis, we 
necessarily are forced to clump Group 1 and Group 2 loans to-
gether. Our resulting estimates average the effect of Group 1 and 
Group 2, which in this hypothetical would result in an overall ef-
fect of loans 6 percent ([0+12]/2) less likely to be approved. Thus, 
if anything, this ambiguity only understates the level of discrim-
ination (“true” level of 12 percent compared to the estimated effect 
of 6 percent) but does not invalidate our estimates. 
b)  Empirical evidence. We further this claim empirically in 
three ways. First, we track the rate of same-sex loan applications 
in states and local jurisdictions that passed laws prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
FIGURE 2:  CHANGE IN SAME-SEX LOAN APPLICATIONS BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE PASSAGE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
 
Figure 2 above tracks the proportion of same-sex loan appli-
cations over time, centered on the year the law passed (because 
not all laws are passed in the same year). The horizontal axis 
measures time in years before and after the law is passed, and 
the vertical axis measures the proportion of same-sex loans. As 
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Figure 2 demonstrates, there is a marked increase in same-sex 
loans after the law passes that persists through the end of our 
data range. Under the assumption that the Group 1 (perceived 
heterosexual co-applicants, such as parent-child) same-sex loans 
will not be affected by changes in anti–sexual orientation discrim-
ination laws, Figure 2 suggests that laws are specifically opening 
the door for more Group 2 (perceived gay co-applicants) loans. 
Figure 2 is also consistent with previous research showing 
that same-sex loan applications increased after the decision in 
Obergefell v Hodges.180 This study, conducted by HUD in 2016, ex-
ploited the “variation across states prior to the Supreme Court 
decision to investigate the effect of marriage laws on demand for 
mortgage credit.”181 By using the same methodology that we do—
looking at the reported sex of co-applicants—it concluded that 
states that passed same-sex marriage laws “experienced [an] 8 to 
13 percent increase in same-sex mortgage applications.”182 
FIGURE 3:  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SIZE OF THE LGBT 
COMMUNITY AND THE PROPORTION OF SAME-SEX LOANS BY 
STATE183 
 
 
 180 135 S Ct 2584 (2015). See generally Miller and Park, Same-Sex Marriage Laws 
(cited in note 177). 
 181 Miller and Park, Same-Sex Marriage Laws at *1 (cited in note 177). 
 182 Id at *2. 
 183 The vertical axis measures proportions for each series separated on the horizontal 
axis into each state and the District of Columbia. 
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Second, Figure 3 shows that the number of loan applications 
with two co-applicants of the same sex correlates to the size of the 
LGBT community. This suggests that many of the same-sex loan 
applications in our dataset were submitted by gay or lesbian cou-
ples rather than other same-sex co-applicants, such as roommates 
or relatives of the same sex. In Figure 3, we compare the propor-
tion of same-sex loans per state—the top line—to the actual pro-
portion of individuals in the state that consider themselves part 
of the LGBT community—the lower line.184 Both lines trend to-
gether, with a correlation coefficient of 0.71, suggesting a strong 
and robust correlation. Essentially, in states with a larger LGBT 
community, more same-sex applications are filed. Figure 3 there-
fore suggests that most of the same-sex applications we measure 
are, in fact, home loan applications filed by gay co-applicants. 
Part II.C reports the result of a third robustness test leading to 
the same conclusion. 
B. The Model 
1. The data and methodology. 
Our study relies on three datasets. The first two are proprie-
tary and include state- and local-level protection against antidis-
crimination practices in mortgage lending.185 The third has pub-
licly available data on home mortgages reported by financial 
institutions pursuant to the HMDA. We study every home loan 
application in the United States reported under the HMDA be-
 
 184 Data on the LGBT community comes from Same-Sex Couple and LGBT 
Demographic Data Interactive (The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, May 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/A9T7-LXPM. 
 185 All state-level fair housing laws were collected from Westlaw. For states that had 
sexual orientation protection, we recorded the date the statute was passed or the relevant 
section was added and the date it became effective. Assembling a database that includes 
all local and county ordinances was more challenging. First, no one source compiles all 
local laws. In addition, we found that some localities maintain extensive histories, while 
others do not. To address these issues, we reviewed a number of leading databases, includ-
ing Municode, Code Publishing, American Legal Publishing, General Code Corporation, 
Qcode, Coded Systems, and Conway Greene. We then compared the results to earlier lists 
by other organizations, such as the Human Rights Campaign, and attempted to track the 
legislative history—particularly the enactment and effective dates—for ordinances with 
sexual orientation protection. 
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tween the years 2010 and 2015—about five million observa-
tions.186 To keep the risk of the loan constant, we restrict the da-
taset to include only applications made for FHA loans in which 
the applicant has a co-applicant.187 
Our outcome of interest is an indicator variable signifying 
whether or not the loan was accepted. The variable equals 1 if the 
loan was accepted and 0 if the loan was rejected.188 In addition to 
the gender and racial makeup of the applicant and co-applicant, 
we are able to control for a myriad of factors that influence the 
probability of whether a home loan is accepted. These include the 
applicant’s income, loan amount, property type,189 loan purpose,190 
whether or not the home will be owner occupied, whether or not 
the applicant had been preapproved, the applicant’s ethnicity, 
and the reason for denial, if any. We include each of these varia-
bles in each model to account for any observable factor that may 
influence the bank’s decision to accept or deny the loan. 
To account for any national, unobserved trends in the data, 
we also include in each model year-fixed effects. These dummy 
variables allow us to control for changes in home loan trends that 
are common across all loans in a given year.191 
Additionally, we control for variation between different 
banks in the same county and different branches of the same bank 
in different counties. To see why, suppose that Bank I and Bank II 
are large national banks with branches in numerous counties in 
the United States. Bank I may have different lending practices 
than Bank II. Similarly, a branch of Bank I in one county may 
have different lending practices than a branch of Bank I in a dif-
ferent county. To control for these two forms of variation (inter-
bank and intrabank), we create a dummy variable for each bank 
in each county. That is, we create a set of dummy variables for 
Bank I for each county in each state, and we do the same for all 
the other banks. These bank-by-county fixed effects absorb all 
 
 186 We chose these years in an attempt to avoid the housing market crash and aftermath. 
 187 A similar method is employed in a study of FHA loans that did not require co-
applicants by Greg Buchak and Adam Jørring, Does Competition Reduce Racial 
Discrimination in Lending? *7 (unpublished research paper, The University of Chicago, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/YB9F-BHM6. 
 188 This measurement of loan application success is a common measure in the dis-
crimination literature. See, for example, id at *11. 
 189 There are three property types: single family, multifamily, and manufacturing 
housing. 
 190 The “loan purpose” can be home purchase, home improvement, or home refinancing. 
 191 For instance, the changing landscape of home mortgages in the United States fol-
lowing the housing market collapse would be accounted for with year-fixed effects. 
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crossbank and crosscounty differences. All the variation that re-
mains is the differences in lending practices within banks in the 
same county. Put differently, including these fixed effects allows 
us to look at how the same bank in the same county treats differ-
ent applications. These variables allow us to exploit the within-
bank and within-county variation.192 
Discrimination is a comparative term. Accordingly, our com-
parison group is the white male/white female pair—the most com-
mon combination in the dataset. Our independent variables are a 
set of all the remaining fifteen possible gender and race combina-
tions between a primary applicant and a co-applicant. We thus 
have a separate dummy variable for each of the following combi-
nations: (1) white male/black male, (2) white male/white male, 
(3) black male/black male, (4) black male/white male, (5) white 
female/black male, (6) white female/white male, (7) black 
female/black male, (8) black female/white male, (9) white 
female/black female, (10) white female/white female, (11) black 
female/black female, (12) black female/white female, (13) white 
male/black female, (14) black male/black female, (15) black 
male/white female. 
Formally, Equation 1 estimates the following linear probabil-
ity model: 
  
 
 192 With the HMDA dataset, we are able to drill down to a geographical level of gran-
ularity finer than county and go all the way down to census tract, which typically consists 
of neighborhoods within a county with a population of around four thousand. For compu-
tational reasons, we feel county-by-bank effects are more appropriate. One major empiri-
cal decision to balance in this Article is the tradeoff between very precise data and allowing 
for enough identifying variation. For instance, if we compared the same banks within a 
state, that would provide plenty of observations nested within each fixed effect, but it may 
oversimplify the mortgage process because geographic and economic conditions vary 
wildly within a state. On the other hand, drilling down to the neighborhood level provides 
the best comparison, but functionally, the analysis is weakened by the lack of diversity in 
application types. Put differently, if we compare Bank A in State 1, there will be lots of 
applications to look at, but they will be for homes in potentially very different neighbor-
hoods. On the other hand, if we look only in the same neighborhoods, there is a real possi-
bility that a bank may not cover all fifteen types of race/gender combinations we analyze 
in this study. We believe that county-by-bank effects best balance the need for a tight 
comparison window while keeping a critical mass of observations in each window. The 
main results are, however, completely unchanged if we instead include census tract–by–
bank effects. 
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Where 𝐿"#$% represents whether or not loan application 𝑖 was ac-
cepted at bank 𝑏 in county 𝑐 in year 𝑦. 𝑋"#$% is a matrix of covari-
ates that influence the probability a home loan is accepted,193 𝜏% 
is a set of time-fixed effects, 𝜌#$ is the set of bank-by-county fixed 
effects, and 𝑒"#$% is the error term. The remaining fifteen varia-
bles measure the effect of each unique pair of race and gender 
combinations. Accordingly, the coefficient 𝑏> can be interpreted 
as the percentage point change in the probability of loan ac-
ceptance. The omitted group is a white male applicant with a 
white female co-applicant. 
2. Model validity. 
HMDA data is rich and provides the most complete coverage 
of the loan application process.194 Still, there are many concerns 
that need to be addressed. 
a)  Linear probability modeling. A restricted dependent vari-
able, such as a binary outcome of whether or not a loan was ac-
cepted, violates the assumptions of ordinary least squares esti-
mation (OLS), in part because the dependent variable is not 
continuous but also because the standard errors are misesti-
mated. Additionally, it is possible for a linear probability model 
(OLS applied to a binary outcome variable) to produce model es-
timates that yield a nonsensical predicted probability that is 
greater than one. Alternative estimation techniques such as logit 
and probit models correct for this by constraining the model to be 
bound between zero and one. These models, however, come with 
their own set of assumptions and perform equally as poorly, if not 
worse, than linear probability models.195 
In the context of this Article, we are able to alleviate the typ-
ical concerns associated with linear probability modeling. First, 
 
 193 See notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 194 See Miller and Park, Same-Sex Marriage Laws at *6 (cited in note 177). 
 195 See generally William Greene, The Behaviour of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
of Limited Dependent Variable Models in the Presence of Fixed Effects, 7 Econometrics J 
98 (2004). 
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we adjust for bias in the estimation of the standard errors by clus-
tering the standard errors in each model at the state level. Se-
cond, in our dataset, 47 percent of the loans we analyze were ac-
cepted. Thus, the oft-voiced critique that linear probability 
models perform poorly when there are very few events (that is, no 
loans were accepted) or very few nonevents (in other words, al-
most all loans are accepted) is not an issue.196 Lastly, we are 
mostly interested in calculating marginal effects for each of the 
pair combinations and less concerned about making predictions 
or forecasts of the full model. Accordingly, the concern that a lin-
ear probability model could produce predictions of a probability 
greater (or less) than one is not an issue. We turn to review other 
potential pitfalls discussed in the home mortgage literature, 
which are not specific to Equation 1. 
b)  Demographics as an endogenous instrument for economic 
conditions. Many early studies of home mortgage discrimination 
pointed to the possibility of race, or any other demographic, as 
nothing more than a proxy for another, unobserved variable.197 
For instance, if blacks disproportionally apply for home loans in 
more economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, lenders may be 
more likely to deny the loan application. The reason is not due to 
racial discrimination but rather due to the perceived high risk of 
extending a loan to applicants residing in such neighborhoods. As 
we previously mention, economists often refer to this type of dis-
crimination as statistical discrimination: discrimination that is 
based on a factor other than a demographic characteristic. 
Our study finds more conclusive evidence that the motivation 
for discrimination is taste-based, or bigotry, than any previous 
econometric study. The reason is that, unlike with race, lenders 
are less likely to rely on perceived sexual orientation as a proxy 
for increased risk.198 Moreover, given the sheer magnitude of the 
dataset HMDA offers, we are able to control for lender-by-county 
fixed effects. That is, our analysis compares loan applications con-
sidered by the same lender from those who reside in the same 
county, which by definition has the same risk to the lender (they 
 
 196 See Gary King and Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data, 9 
Political Analysis 137, 150 (2001). 
 197 For a defense of such studies, see generally James H. Carr and Isaac F. 
Megbolugbe, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study on Mortgage Lending Revisited, 4 
J Housing Rsrch 277 (1993); Lynn E. Browne and Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Mortgage Lending 
in Boston—A Response to the Critics, 1995 New England Econ Rev 53. 
 198 See The LGBT Financial Experience at *10 (cited in note 175). 
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are all FHA loans).199 It is thus very likely that the reason for any 
disparate treatment was not based on factors relevant to risk as-
sessment but on the applicants’ perceived sexual orientation.200 
c) Risks observed by the bank but not by the researcher. There
is also some concern that there are factors that the lenders are 
able to observe and include in a risk assessment of the loan appli-
cation that we, as researchers, are not able to observe in the data. 
The most glaring example is credit scores, which are probably the 
single strongest indicator of risk and are a factor observed by the 
lender.201 Despite its richness, HMDA does not include credit 
scores. However, as Part II.A.1 explains above, our research de-
sign allows us to address and mitigate this concern in a myriad of 
ways, one of which is by focusing solely on FHA loans.202 The 
unique feature of these loans is that they carry the same low level 
of risk to the lender. An applicant approved for an FHA loan pays 
 199 For computation reasons, we include county-by-bank fixed effects. Our results are 
insensitive to the inclusion of census tract–by–bank fixed effects, which is an even more 
direct measure of neighborhood effects. 
 200 We add a word of caution. Although our findings suggest that the discrimination 
is motivated by bigotry, it is important to note that other forces may be in play that may 
explain the results. First, the discrimination observed may be the result of “carried-over” 
discrimination—that is, discrimination that occurred prior to the application process, and 
what we observe in the mortgage market is just a downstream consequence of previous 
discrimination. For example, if members of the LGB community are discriminated against 
in labor markets and consequently switch jobs more often than other groups, they may be 
less likely to be approved for FHA loans, which require that applicants hold a steady two-
year income. In this regard, we are able to control for loans that were denied due to em-
ployment history, so any observed discriminatory effect is occurring independent of up-
stream employment discrimination. LGB individuals may also find it harder to meet the 
FHA documentation requirement. One recent study reports that 57 percent of LGBTQ 
individuals experienced discrimination across many areas of life.” See Discrimination in 
America: Experiences and Views of LGBTQ Americans *2 (NPR, Nov 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FV28-9GZJ. Another reports that “34% of LGBT people who experienced 
discrimination in the past year avoided public places . . . and 18% avoided doctors’ offices.” 
Movement Advancement Project, LGBT Policy Spotlight: Public Accommodations 
Nondiscrimination Laws *2 (MAP, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/EV8H-FMM5. Com-
bined, these studies suggest that members of the LGBT community are less likely to pro-
duce necessary documents. Similar to employment history, we are able to control for ap-
plications that were denied due to improper documentation. Moreover, the observed 
discrimination may be, at least in part, the product of other agents. For example, the dis-
crimination may be due to disparate treatment by bigoted appraisers who are required to 
assess the purchased property. However, taken together, it is more likely that discrimina-
tion takes place at the point of sale—that is, with the loan officer. 
201 See note 168. 
 202 For a recent article employing a similar strategy, see generally Buchak and 
Jørring, Does Competition Reduce Racial Discrimination? (cited in note 187). 
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an FHA insurance premium. In case of a default, the lender re-
coups the losses from the government.203 As a result, every FHA 
loan bears the same risk and expected return to the lender re-
gardless of the demographic characteristics of the applicant. Ac-
cordingly, it is unlikely that disparate treatment in FHA loan de-
nial can be traced to an unobserved (to the researcher) measure 
of risk. 
C. Results 
The results for our main analysis of Equation 1 can be seen 
in Table 2 and graphically in Figure 4. 
203 See id at *7–8. 
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TABLE 2:  PROBABILITY OF LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY RACE AND 
GENDER204 
Applicant Co-applicant (1) (2) 
White Male Black Male -0.038** 
(0.017) 
-0.043*** 
(0.014) 
White Male White Male -0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.025*** 
(0.003) 
Black Male Black Male -0.087*** 
(0.008) 
-0.075*** 
(0.009) 
Black Male White Male -0.070*** 
(0.014) 
-0.068*** 
(0.011) 
White Female Black Male 0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.040*** 
(0.005) 
White Female White Male 0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.037*** 
(0.003) 
Black Female Black Male -0.038*** 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Black Female White Male -0.007 
(0.008) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
White Female Black Female -0.028 
(0.017) 
0.014 
(0.015) 
White Female White Female -0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
Black Female Black Female -0.062*** 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
Black Female White Female -0.043*** 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
White Male Black Female 0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Black Male Black Female -0.033*** 
(0.003) 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
Black Male White Female 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
Controls 
Sample Size 
R Squared 
5,864,086 
0.32 
X 
 5,864,086 
0.42 
 204 Columns (1) and (2) in this table each represent a unique regression in which the 
unit of observation is at the individual loan application level. Column (1) includes year-
fixed and county-by-bank fixed effects, and Column (2) includes the same fixed effects plus 
the other controls mentioned in the text. Each row represents the marginal effect of the 
probability of a loan getting accepted for the associated pairing of applicant and co-
applicant where the comparison group is a white male applicant with a white female co-
applicant. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported below in paren-
theses. Statistical significance levels are marked as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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In Table 2, Column (1) estimates Equation 1 with the inclu-
sion of year and bank-by-county fixed effects, but with no other 
controls. Column (2) reports the results with the controls men-
tioned previously.205 In both models, the corrected standard errors 
clustered at the state level are in parentheses. Each coefficient 
can be interpreted as the percentage point increase (if positive) or 
decrease (if negative) in the likelihood of a loan to be accepted for 
each applicant/co-applicant pair relative to a white male/white 
female applicant pair. For instance, from Column (2) in Table 2, 
a pair consisting of a white male applicant and a black male co-
applicant is 4.3 percentage points less likely to have a loan ac-
cepted as a white male/white female pair asking for the same loan 
amount with the same income from the same lender in the same 
county. This means that, if a white male/black male pair has a 45 
percent chance of having a loan application accepted, we would 
expect a white male/white female pair to have a 49.3 percent 
chance of approval. This is so despite the fact that both pairs re-
quested the same amount for the same purpose with the same in-
come from the same lender in the same county and bear the same 
level of risk to the lender. 
205 See notes 188–91 and accompanying text. 
2019] Empirical Analysis of Sexual Orientation Discrimination 51 
FIGURE 4:  EFFECT OF GENDER AND RACIAL COMPOSITION ON CO-
APPLICANT LOAN ACCEPTANCE206
Figure 4 organizes the results in Table 2 from most negative 
to most positive and includes bands that represent 90 percent con-
fidence intervals. To interpret Figure 4, focus first on the points 
at the center of the intervals. A point that lies below the zero line 
suggests the race/gender pairing is less likely to have a loan ac-
cepted, and a point above the line suggests the acceptance is more 
likely. Now focus on the intervals. If an interval intersects with 
the zero line on the horizontal axis, the estimated effect is not 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
To test once again whether the results are driven by same-
sex gay co-applicants (rather than by same-sex heterosexual 
 206 This figure displays graphically the empirical results from Column (2) in Table 2. 
The marginal effect for each gender and race combination is measured on the vertical axis, 
and each combination of race and gender is measured on the horizontal axis. The first 
letter in each horizontal axis label represents the race of the applicant, the second letter 
signifies the gender, the third letter represents the race of the co-applicant, and the last 
letter represents the gender of the co-applicant. For example, “bmbm” stands for a black 
male applicant with a black male co-applicant. In this specification and all other specifi-
cations, we make no assumption about the symmetry of an applicant and co-applicant. 
That is, there might be reason to believe wmbm may be treated differently from the sym-
metric pairing, bmwm, so we treat each as different. This allows us to check if there is a 
“primary applicant” or “secondary applicant” effect. 
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parent-child co-applicants),207 we remove from the dataset any ap-
plicant or co-applicant that reports more than one race. The ra-
tionale is that keeping only “single-race” applicants would (likely) 
exclude from the data parent-and-child co-applicants. The reason 
is that it is unlikely that a co-applicant who reports one race (for 
example, black) will be the parent of the applicant with only one 
different race (for example, white). We report the results of this 
regression graphically in Figure 5 below. Figure 5 shows that, 
when the sample is restricted to the types of same-sex loans that 
are more likely representative of actual gay couples (Group 2208), 
the results hold and in some cases are slightly stronger. 
FIGURE 5:  EFFECT OF GENDER AND RACIAL COMPOSITION ON 
APPLICATION SUCCESS WHEN THE LOANS ARE MORE LIKELY TO 
BE SUBMITTED BY GAY COUPLES 
The empirical evidence suggests that a large portion of the 
same-sex loan applications are actually loans submitted by gay 
 207 Part II.A.2 reports two additional robustness tests. See notes 183–93 and accom-
panying text. 
 208 Group 2 relationships are ambiguous to the lender. See note 179 and accompany-
ing text. 
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couples. Moreover, the differences between the results that 
Figures 4 and 5 report are also consistent with our theoretical 
prediction in Part II.A that our results are a conservative meas-
ure of discrimination and that the actual level of discrimination 
is higher than we observe. 
1. National patterns in discrimination.
With this in mind, we turn to analyze the results. Figure 4 
provides strong evidence of systemic and widespread discrimina-
tion against gay male couples. More specifically, Figure 4 shows 
that any application with a pair of males is statistically less likely 
to be approved relative to the same white heterosexual pair. 
Within the same-sex male pair groups, race plays a role. Although 
all same-sex male applications are less likely to be accepted, 
black-male pairs are the least likely to be approved (-7.5 per-
centage points), followed by the interracial pairs of black 
male/white male (-6.8), white male/black male (-4.3) and white 
male pair (-2.5). Interestingly, the exact same pattern holds for 
female pairs. From the least to most likely to be approved are 
black female pairs, followed by interracial black female/white 
female and white female/black female pairs, and white female 
pairs. In the case of same-sex pairs (that is, male/male and 
female/female pairs), the data reveals some evidence of a statis-
tically significant “primary applicant” effect. The differences be-
tween interracial pairs, however, are statistically indistinguish-
able from one another. 
Our results shed new light on earlier studies of discrimina-
tion. Previous research has suggested significant and persistent 
evidence of racial discrimination in mortgage lending. Recent es-
timates suggest that black pairs are 7 percentage points less 
likely to have a loan accepted.209 The evidence we present here 
suggests the possibility of a more nuanced story. While race 
seems to play an important role in the probability of getting a 
home loan, interracial applicants and even white male pair appli-
cants are statistically less likely to get accepted. The fact that 
even white male pairs are less likely to get a loan in a similar 
fashion to other same-sex male pairs is important for at least two 
reasons. First, it is evidence of discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation that is consistent with the pair-studies literature. 
 209 See Buchak and Jørring, Does Competition Reduce Racial Discrimination? at *14 
(cited in note 187). 
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Second, the evidence of discrimination against white male pairs 
alleviates the concern that Figure 4 measures nothing more than 
racial discrimination. Finally, even after we control for the gender 
composition of the same-sex pair applicants, we do find that, com-
pared to the white heterosexual baseline, a pair consisting of a 
black male and a black female is still statistically less likely to 
have a home loan application accepted. The effect, however, is 
about half as small as previous estimates.210 
Another interesting finding in our results is the lack of sym-
metry of effect between perceived gay and perceived lesbian co-
applicants. We find that every possible racial combination of male 
pairs is statistically disadvantaged when getting a loan applica-
tion approved. By contrast, in every case, a female pair is either 
statistically indistinguishable from the baseline group or actually 
has a higher likelihood of getting the loan accepted. This result is 
actually consistent with much of the experimental literature on 
sexual orientation discrimination in housing211 and coincides well 
with the growing body of literature about the social acceptability 
of lesbian, but not gay male, relationships.212 
It is important to remember that we do not observe the na-
ture of the relationship between the co-applicants in the data.213 
However, unlike other salient bases for discrimination (such as 
race), sexual orientation is much harder for the loan officer to ob-
serve. In many cases, the loan officer does not know with certainty 
either the orientation of the applicants or their relationship. In 
the absence of a clear signal, the discriminatory loan officer (ei-
ther overtly or inadvertently) likely uses the gender and race of 
the co-applicants as a proxy for sexual orientation. We, in effect, 
use the same proxy in this study. The proxy is admittedly imper-
fect. Surely there are times that the bias, even an intentional one, 
 210 See id (7 percentage points); Munnell, et al, 86 Am Econ Rev at 33 (cited in note 
126) (8.2 percentage points). 
 211 See generally Friedman, et al, An Estimate of Housing Discrimination (cited in 
note 142) (finding a similar, but larger, effect for gay men compared to lesbian women); 
Lauster and Easterbrook, 58 Soc Probs at 389 (cited in note 14) (finding an even more 
pronounced discrimination against gay men). 
 212 See, for example, Robert Anderson and Tina Fetner, Cohort Differences in Tolerance 
of Homosexuality: Attitudinal Change in Canada and the United States, 72 Pub Opinion 
Q, 311, 314 (2008); Gregory M. Herek and John P. Capitanio, Sex Differences in How 
Heterosexuals Think about Lesbians and Gay Men: Evidence from Survey Context Effects, 
36 J Sex Rsrch 348, 357 (1999). See also Elmslie and Tebaldi, 28 J of Labor Rsrch at 441 
(cited in note 14) (a labor market study noting that “[t]he bias against gay men is much 
stronger than the bias toward lesbians”). 
213 See Part II.A.2 and notes 207–08 and accompanying text. 
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would be the result of a mistake. For instance, the loan officer 
may mistakenly believe that a pair of heterosexual male appli-
cants is involved in a homosexual relationship. These heterosex-
ual applicants may thus receive the same discriminatory treat-
ment as if they were gay. In our eyes (and in the eyes of the law), 
this does not mean the analysis is flawed. All it means is that 
discrimination is happening against gay applicants and appli-
cants who are perceived to be gay. What could result, potentially, 
is actually “overdiscrimination”—that is, discrimination against 
the targeted group and, in addition, discrimination against others 
who are perceived as belonging to the targeted group. 
2. Regional patterns in discrimination.
The results that Table 2 and Figure 4 report above compare 
loan applications to other loan applications from the same bank 
in the same county, in order to control for external variables, and 
then aggregate the results for the entire country by race and gen-
der pairings. There may be reason, however, to believe that dif-
ferent regions in the United States or different types of banks dis-
criminate differently. To control for this, we first divide the data 
into four census regions, re-estimate Equation 1, and replicate 
Table 2 and Figure 4. Instead of looking at the effect of a gender 
and race applicant makeup of, say, black male/black male, we di-
vide that single dummy variable into four variables that signify 
whether the loan was filed by (a) a pair of black males in the West, 
(b) a pair of black males in the South, (c) a pair of black males in 
the Midwest, or (d) a pair of black males in the Northeast.214 We 
do this for each of our fifteen gender and race indicator variables 
of interest and include them all in the regression. What results is 
an estimate of the probability of loan acceptance for each group 
by region. Those results are summarized in Table 3 and Figure 6 
below. 
 214 For more on census regions, see Geographic Terms and Concepts—Census 
Divisions and Census Regions (United States Census Bureau), archived at 
http://perma.cc/S64H-9443. 
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TABLE 3:  PROBABILITY OF LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY RACE, GENDER, 
AND REGION215 
Applicant Co-applicant Northeast Midwest South West 
White Male Black Male -0.122*** 
(0.030) 
-0.018 
(0.035) 
-0.027* 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
White Male White Male -0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
-0.033*** 
(0.005) 
Black Male Black Male -0.076*** 
(0.006) 
-0.086*** 
(0.015) 
-0.076*** 
(0.013) 
-0.052*** 
(0.007) 
Black Male White Male -0.078*** -0.072** -0.061*** -0.065** 
(0.010) (0.031) (0.020) (0.032) 
White Female Black Male 0.033** 
(0.012) 
0.035*** 
(0.010) 
0.042*** 
(0.007) 
0.046*** 
(0.006) 
White Female White Male 0.037*** 
(0.003) 
0.037*** 
(0.003) 
0.039*** 
(0.003) 
0.036*** 
(0.002) 
Black Female Black Male 0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Black Female White Male 0.027*** 
(0.004) 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
White Female Black Female -0.008 
(0.024) 
0.031 
(0.046) 
0.021 
(0.021) 
0.016 
(0.027) 
White Female White Female 0.026*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.028*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
Black Female Black Female -0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.027*** 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.040*** 
(0.008) 
Black Female White Female 0.033 
(0.021) 
-0.032 
(0.022) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.017 
(0.044) 
White Male Black Female 0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
Black Male Black Female -0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.029*** 
(0.005) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
Black Male White Female 0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Sample Size 
R Squared 
 5,864,086 
0.42 
Table 3 and Figure 6 indicate that all regions in the United 
States exhibit the same pattern of discrimination we observe on 
 215 Unlike in Table 2, each column in Table 3 reports results for the same regression 
that splits the effect of each race and gender pairing by region. This regression includes 
all the same controls and fixed effects as Column (2) of Table 3, and the standard errors 
are clustered at the state level. While we do not report the results by region without con-
trols similar to Column (1) of Table 2, the results are available upon request and are vir-
tually the same as the results that Table 3 reports. Statistical significance levels are 
marked as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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the national level. In each region, all four groups (male, female, 
black, and white applicants) are discriminated against based on 
perceived sexual orientation. In other words, all applications filed 
by same-sex pairs are less likely to be accepted compared to the 
white heterosexual pair. In certain circumstances, the negative 
effect is statistically insignificant, but it is still negative. For in-
stance, in the Midwest, an application filed by an interracial 
same-sex pair consisting of a white male and black male pair is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. By contrast, an applica-
tion filed by other same-sex male pairs is statistically less likely 
to get accepted by the same bank in the same county as the white 
heterosexual pair application. That same group of applicants—
white male/black male—is also statistically insignificant in the 
West, but again, each of the other three highlighted same-sex 
groups are still statistically worse off. Interestingly, the data sug-
gests that this interracial pair is discriminated against most in 
the Northeast. In that region, applications from white male/black 
male pairs are 12.2 percentage points less likely to be approved. 
The result is not only the worst in magnitude but also the most 
statistically significant (at the 99 percent level). 
58 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1 
FIGURE 6:  EFFECT OF GENDER AND RACIAL COMPOSITION ON 
CO-APPLICANT LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY REGION216
Based on the results in Figure 6, there is no evidence that 
any single region in the United States is driving the results. 
There may have been a temptation to blame certain regions of the 
United States for the discrimination that seems to be occurring. 
However, the data suggests that discrimination based on (per-
ceived) sexual orientation is widespread and not isolated to any 
specific geographic region. Put differently, no region is insulated 
from those discriminatory behaviors.217 
To explore this point further, we repeat the regional analysis 
above, but instead of splitting the data by region, we split it by 
political party lines. To do so, we sort each state into one of three 
 216 While the interpretation of the intervals and the points in the intervals is the same 
as in Figure 4, it is important to note that each region subfigure in Figure 6 is derived 
from the same regression—which Table 4 reports—aimed to tease out regional effects in 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
 217 Formal statistical tests of equivalence across regions suggests that of the fifteen 
combinations of race and gender, only five are statistically different—suggesting again 
that in most cases, there is very little difference in the effects across regions. 
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categories: states commonly considered “blue” states that basi-
cally always vote Democrat in a presidential election,218 “red” 
states that basically always vote Republican in a presidential 
election,219 or “swing” states220 that could go either way. The re-
sults for this regression are summarized in Table 4 and Figure 7. 
 218 Those states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Washington. 
 219 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, and West Virginia. 
 220 Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. These characterizations are based 
on the outcomes of previous presidential elections as reported by www.270towin.com, 
though the results are insensitive to alternative specifications of swing states. 
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TABLE 4:  PROBABILITY OF LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY POLITICAL 
PARTY LINES221 
To compare the patterns of discrimination based on political 
party lines to those observed in the national pattern, Figure 7 in-
cludes the graph from Figure 4. Similar to the analysis by region, 
we see no obvious pattern that follows party lines. While there 
 221 This Table is organized in the same manner as Table 5. Each column includes 
estimates for each applicant/co-applicant pairing from the same regression that includes 
all the controls and fixed effects. Each column also clusters the robust standard errors at 
the state level. Statistical significance levels are marked as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
Applicant Co-applicant Democrat Republican Swing 
White Male Black Male -0.068** 
(0.026) 
-0.040* 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
White Male White Male -0.033*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.021*** 
(0.004) 
Black Male Black Male -0.068*** 
(0.009) 
-0.071*** 
(0.010) 
-0.088*** 
(0.015) 
Black Male White Male -0.087*** 
(0.019) 
-0.044** 
(0.020) 
-0.062*** 
(0.017) 
White Female Black Male 0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.042*** 
(0.005) 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
White Female White Male 0.036*** 
(0.003) 
0.039*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.003) 
Black Female Black Male 0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Black Female White Male 0.023*** 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
White Female Black Female 0.005 
(0.016) 
0.020 
(0.033) 
0.024 
(0.024) 
White Female White Female 0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
0.028*** 
(0.005) 
Black Female Black Female -0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.021** 
(0.010) 
Black Female White Female -0.008 
(0.029) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
White Male Black Female 0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
Black Male Black Female -0.020*** 
(0.002) 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.030*** 
(0.003) 
Black Male White Female 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Sample Size 
R Squared 
 5,864,086 
0.42 
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are some differences for specific groups across party lines, most of 
those differences are small and statistically insignificant. Thus, 
while the magnitude of the effect varies slightly, the application 
of a pair consisting of two black males is no better positioned to 
be accepted in, for example, Utah than in Oregon or Wisconsin 
(all else equal). One interesting exception is that Democratic 
states are the least tolerant to the two groups of interracial male 
pairs. The results are not only substantially stronger in magni-
tude—in the case of the black/white male pair, the chance to be 
approved in a Democratic state is about half compared to that in 
Republican states—but they are also most statically significant. 
More broadly, Figure 7 demonstrates that these lending patterns 
cannot be attributed simply to the mindset of a specific region or 
a certain political philosophy. These patterns of discrimination 
are widespread and can be observed in virtually every geopolitical 
segment of the United States. 
FIGURE 7:  EFFECT OF GENDER AND RACIAL COMPOSITION ON CO-
APPLICANT LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY POLITICAL PARTY LINES222 
 222 This Figure replicates the results that Figure 6 presents in every way except when 
each coefficient is split by party lines instead of region. Additionally, the main result from 
Figure 2 is included in the top left quadrant by way of comparison. 
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One last potential source of variation that may be driving the 
results is not necessarily the makeup of the community but rather 
the lenders themselves. Though unlikely, given the within bank-
county analysis we conduct in this study, there may be something 
about the way large versus medium or smaller banks operate that 
may inform the results we present here. For example, one could 
argue that larger banks are less likely to discriminate because, 
among other possible reasons, they may have better procedures 
or higher exposure. To test this, we split out the data by the ten 
largest banks in terms of loan applications received. These banks 
make up about 40 percent of the loan applications in our database. 
We then compare the “Top Ten” banks to all banks in the smallest 
25 percent by loan applications handled and all other medium 
banks in between.223 The results, which Table 5 and Figure 8 pre-
sent, suggest a very similar pattern. Large, medium, and smaller 
banks act very much in the same way. 
 223 In our dataset, those banks include loandepot.com, Flagstar Bank, Freedom 
Mortgage, Advanced Financial Services, JP Morgan Chase, Quicken Loans, Bank of America, 
and three different classifications for Wells Fargo. 
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TABLE 5:  PROBABILITY OF LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY RACE AND 
GENDER AND BANK SIZE224 
Applicant Co-applicant Ten Largest Banks Medium Banks Smallest Banks 
White Male Black Male -0.019 
(0.022) 
-0.056** 
(0.025) 
-0.060** 
(0.026) 
White Male White Male -0.026*** 
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.026*** 
(0.004) 
Black Male Black Male -0.040*** 
(0.009) 
-0.098*** 
(0.013) 
-0.102*** 
(0.013) 
Black Male White Male  -0.056*** 
(0.016) 
-0.062*** 
(0.020) 
-0.105*** 
(0.026) 
White Female Black Male 0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.042*** 
(0.007) 
0.057*** 
(0.011) 
White Female White Male 0.036*** 
(0.002) 
0.039*** 
(0.003) 
0.039*** 
(0.003) 
Black Female Black Male 0.025*** 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
Black Female White Male 0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
White Female Black Female 0.010 
(0.022) 
0.020 
(0.021) 
0.009 
(0.034) 
White Female White Female 0.024*** 
(0.005) 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
Black Female Black Female 0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.031*** 
(0.010) 
-0.026** 
(0.012) 
Black Female White Female -0.032 
(0.022) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
0.018 
(0.025) 
White Male Black Female -0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
Black Male Black Female -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.035*** 
(0.002) 
-0.033*** 
(0.004) 
Black Male White Female  -0.003 
(0.005) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
Sample Size 
R Squared 
 5,864,086  
0.42 
 224 In this table, each race and gender pairing was sorted by whether the application 
went to a “big bank,” medium bank, or a smaller bank. The results in this table are gen-
erated by the same regression and are organized similarly to the previous two tables. Sta-
tistical significance levels are marked as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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FIGURE 8:  EFFECT OF GENDER AND RACIAL COMPOSITION ON 
CO-APPLICANT LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY BANK SIZE225 
It is important to note, however, that among the largest 
banks, the magnitudes of the effects of race and sexual orienta-
tion are smaller in ways that are, at times, meaningful. For in-
stance, an application filed by a pair consisting of two black male 
co-applicants at one of the ten largest banks is only 4 percentage 
points less likely to get accepted than that of a white heterosexual 
pair. The same pair is 9 percentage points less likely to get ac-
cepted at all other banks. Also, the effect for applications filed by 
interracial pairs consisting of white male and black male co-
applicants is much smaller and statistically insignificant for big 
banks. 
3. Remedies for reversing trends of systematic and
widespread bias.
The evidence we present here suggests a systematic and wide-
spread bias against FHA loan applications filed by any male pair, 
regardless of race. It may be the case, though, that the reason for 
these discriminatory patterns is more nuanced. For instance, it 
 225 Both subfigures come from a single regression that Table 6 reports. This figure 
reads and interprets the same as each previous figure. 
bm
bm
 
bm
wm
 
wm
bm
 
wm
wm
 
bm
bf
 
bf
bf
 
bf
wf
 
wm
bf
 
bf
bm
 
bm
wf
 
wf
bf
 
bf
wm
 
wf
wf
 
wf
wm
 
wf
bm
 -.
15
 -.
1 
-.0
5 
0 
.0
5 
.1
 
bm
bm
 
bm
wm
 
wm
bm
 
wm
wm
 
bm
bf
 
bf
bf
 
bf
wf
 
wm
bf
 
bf
bm
 
bm
wf
 
wf
bf
 
bf
wm
 
wf
wf
 
wf
wm
 
wf
bm
 -
.1
 -.
05
 0
 .0
5 
  
bm
bm
 
bm
wm
 
wm
bm
 
wm
wm
 
bm
bf
 
bf
bf
 
bf
wf
 
wm
bf
 
bf
bm
 
bm
wf
 
wf
bf
 
bf
wm
 
wf
wf
 
wf
wm
 
wf
bm
 
-.1
 -.
05
 0
 .0
5 
10 Largest Banks Medium Banks 
Small Banks 
2019] Empirical Analysis of Sexual Orientation Discrimination 65 
could be that the results are not an artifact of regional differences 
in attitudes or political opinions but the lack of contact with the 
affected group. Assuming this is true, what can be done to remedy 
the situation? 
a) The “Contact Hypothesis.” To understand the Contact
Hypothesis, suppose the average loan officer identifies as straight 
and has well-established biases against the LGB community—
specifically, biases against gay men. Research shows that efforts 
to reduce such intergroup bias in a meaningful and enduring way 
demand thorough and intense intervention over a long period.226 
One type of intervention that has had some reported effect in re-
ducing intergroup bias is sustained contact with individuals of 
the affected group.227 The idea behind the prevailing (yet debated) 
Contact Hypothesis is that, under certain conditions, intergroup 
bias would decrease as individual contact between different 
groups’ members increases.228 
Could it be that our results are being driven by a lack of sus-
tained contact with the affected groups? We test this by compar-
ing loan acceptance rates between urban and rural environments. 
Under the Contact Hypothesis, one would expect to observe less 
discrimination in urban environments. Based simply on sheer 
population numbers, it is likely that the average loan officer op-
erating in an urban area has a higher chance of sustained contact 
with gay men. We loosely define an environment as urban if its 
population density is above average and as rural if its population 
density is below average.229 Table 6 and Figure 9 below report the 
results for each of the gender and race pair variations in these 
environments. 
 226 For a review of intergroup bias and attempts to decrease it, see Thomas F. Pettigrew 
and Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J Personality and 
Soc Psychology 751, 766–83 (2006). 
 227 As an example, see generally Shana Levin, Colette van Laar, and Jim Sidanius, The 
Effects of Ingroup and Outgroup Friendships on Ethnic Attitudes in College: A Longitudinal 
Study, 6 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 76 (2003) (finding that college students 
exposed to intergroup relationships were more likely to report having friends from those 
groups and less likely to display biased behaviors in subsequent college years). 
 228 See David Broockman and Joshua Kalla, Durably Reducing Transphobia: A Field 
Experiment on Door-to-Door Canvassing, 352 Science 220, 223 (2016). 
 229 Consider Briggs Depew and Isaac D. Swensen, The Decision to Carry: The Effect 
of Crime on Concealed-Carry Applications (IZA Institute of Labor Economics Discussion 
Paper No 10236, Sept 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/MEJ5-JYB7. This Article splits 
groups between rural and urban in a similar fashion. 
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TABLE 6:  PROBABILITY OF LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY RACE, GENDER, 
AND POPULATION DENSITY230 
Applicant Co-applicant Rural Urban 
White Male Black Male -0.039** 
(0.015) 
-0.048** 
(0.022) 
White Male White Male -0.025*** 
(0.003) 
-0.025*** 
(0.003) 
Black Male Black Male -0.082*** 
(0.010) 
-0.067*** 
(0.009) 
Black Male White Male -0.054*** 
(0.018) 
-0.082*** 
(0.015) 
White Female Black Male 0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.041*** 
(0.006) 
White Female White Male 0.035*** 
(0.003) 
0.040*** 
(0.003) 
Black Female Black Male 0.005 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Black Female White Male 0.020*** 
(0.007) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
White Female Black Female 0.004 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.018) 
White Female White Female 0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
Black Female Black Female -0.011* 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
Black Female White Female 0.010 
(0.020) 
-0.023 
(0.022) 
White Male Black Female -0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
Black Male Black Female -0.026*** 
(0.002) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
Black Male White Female 0.000 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Sample Size 
R Squared 
 5,864,086 
0.42 
230 See Tables 3 through 5 for more information on interpreting this table. 
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FIGURE 9: EFFECT OF GENDER AND RACIAL COMPOSITION ON CO-
APPLICANT LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY POPULATION DENSITY231 
We find the same pattern of systemic discrimination with vir-
tually no evidence of any difference in loan application acceptance 
between rural and urban environments. While the point esti-
mates in Figure 9’s two graphs vary slightly, the differences are 
not significant, and each of the four disadvantaged male pair 
groups232 is still less likely to get a loan approved in a statistically 
significant way. Thus, if comparing rural to urban settings is a 
reasonable proxy for association with gay men, it appears that 
contact alone may not reduce intergroup bias. 
b) State and local laws. As we explain earlier, discrimination
based on sexual orientation is not prohibited under federal law.233 
 231 This Figure reports the regression results of Table 3. See Figure 2 for more details 
on the construction and interpretation of this Table. 
 232 The groups are (i) black male pairs (experiencing the most discrimination), fol-
lowed by (ii) black male/white male pairs, then (iii) white male/black male pairs, and fi-
nally (iv) white male pairs. 
 233 The Equal Access Rule, which prohibits lenders of FHA loans from engaging in 
this form of discrimination, is an administrative rule. As HUD explicitly admits, the Rule 
does not create a new right for aggrieved parties. See Equal Access Rule, 77 Fed Reg at 
5670–71 (cited in note 10). 
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In light of federal inaction, twenty-three states and over four hun-
dred localities passed laws expressly prohibiting discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in lending.234 These local laws may 
influence lenders’ behaviors. The reason could be intrinsic. Ex-
pressive law theorists, for example, argue that “the mere exist-
ence of [a] law helps to shape and define [people’s] world views” 
and increase compliance.235 Or the reason may be extrinsic. For 
example, it could be that local laws result in increased compliance 
due to enforcement efforts or fear thereof. Alternatively, it could 
be that jurisdictions that adopt local antidiscrimination laws do 
so because they are already more accepting of gay applicants. 
Whatever the reason may be, it is clear that the minority of 
states and localities that adopted these laws were not selected 
randomly to do so. This is important because, hypothetically, the 
best way to measure the efficacy of a law, policy, or any type of 
policy intervention would have been to randomly assign the law 
to half the states and localities and keep the remaining half as a 
control group. In this hypothetical, states and localities would 
have no control over whether they got the law; thus, any differ-
ence in the underlying characteristics between the states and lo-
calities would be random. The reality, however, is that antidis-
crimination laws are not randomly assigned to state and local 
jurisdictions. Similarly, states and localities that declined to 
adopt such protections did not randomly choose to refrain from 
doing so. This calls into question their validity as the comparison 
group and could bias the results.236 This bias would manifest if we 
simply compared states with antidiscrimination laws to states 
234 See Part I.C. 
 235 Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness 
of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 Tex L Rev 1151, 
1184 (2010). 
236 As a hypothetical, imagine a variable called “tolerance toward the LGB commu-
nity.” If this were a variable we could measure, we might find that this variable is highly 
correlated with the passage of local laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. 
That is, localities that are more tolerant toward the LBG community may be more likely 
to pass laws protecting LGB individuals. The “tolerance toward the LBG community” var-
iable would most likely also be correlated with our outcome of interest in our regressions: 
the probability of getting a loan approved for a perceived gay couple. Thus, if we were to 
just compare loan acceptance rates from (state and local) jurisdictions with laws protecting 
LGB individuals to jurisdictions without such laws, we might misinterpret any difference 
as caused by the law when, in fact, the driving force of the difference is not the law but 
rather the “tolerance toward the LGB community” variable. 
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without such laws.237 To alleviate this potential source of statisti-
cal bias, we focus only on states and localities that changed their 
laws within the time window of our dataset, 2010 to 2015. This 
allows us to compare the same local jurisdiction to itself before 
and after it passed the law. Only three states—Maine, Nevada, 
and Utah—and 174 local municipalities changed their laws dur-
ing this window. These states and localities processed almost a 
quarter million loan applications from 2010 to 2015. 
To analyze the effectiveness of local laws, we employ a 
difference-in-differences regression technique. This technique, 
common in policy analysis,238 is a method that helps alleviate the 
lack of an appropriate baseline group by focusing on two base-
lines. The method works as follows: First, we focus on jurisdic-
tions that adopted local laws. Each such jurisdiction is compared 
to itself. Specifically, we calculate the acceptance rate in that 
jurisdiction before the local law was passed and compare it to 
the rate after it was passed. This generates the first difference. 
For example, Nevada passed a law prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination in 2011, and it went into effect that same year. 
Therefore, the first step is comparing Nevada to itself. To calcu-
late the first difference, the regression calculates the difference in 
loan acceptance rates for Nevada before and after the effective 
date. That is, we compare the acceptance rate from 2011 to 2015 
to the rate in 2010. 
This first difference, however, is not enough. It could be that, 
during the year the law changed, other factors that are not unique 
to Nevada influenced the results. For example, it could be that a 
regional crisis influenced the acceptance rate in Nevada. To ac-
count for this, the regression calculates the change in acceptance 
rates between 2011 and 2015 compared to those in 2010 in juris-
dictions that did not adopt a local rule. This is the second differ-
ence. It then compares the first difference to the second one.239 
 237 This is the case because states with these laws are probably fundamentally differ-
ent from states without them. 
 238 For the appropriate use of difference-in-differences estimators, see generally 
Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We Trust 
Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q J Econ 249 (2004). 
 239 Specifically, to calculate the second difference, the regression first focuses on ju-
risdictions that did not adopt a local law. For each of these jurisdictions, it compares the 
second difference: the acceptance rate before and after the effective date. The regression 
then compares the first difference (the acceptance rate in Nevada in the period between 
2011 and 2015 minus the acceptance rate in Nevada in 2010) to the second difference 
(acceptance rate in all jurisdictions that did not adopt such laws for the period of 2011 to 
2015 minus all the acceptance rates in these states in 2010). Formally, this technique 
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The idea is that, while the assignment of the law is still not ran-
dom, using this technique filters out any factor relevant to the 
outcome of interest. Thus, all that remains is the effect of the law 
and random noise not relevant to the law or the outcome.240 
The results of the difference-in-differences estimates of the 
effect of state and local antidiscrimination laws are presented in 
Table 7 and Figure 10. 
requires the inclusion of group fixed effects that flag the treated local and state jurisdic-
tions, a time-fixed effect that flags the treated time, and an interaction between the two. 
 240 One of the assumptions of this modeling technique, however, is that the treated 
state or locality—that is, the jurisdiction that passed a law in our time window—looked 
much like the jurisdictions that serve as controls prior to the passage of the law in terms 
of the outcome variables—in our case, mortgage loan approvals. This assumption is nec-
essary for valid inference. See Griffin Edwards, et al, Looking Down the Barrel of a Loaded 
Gun: The Effect of Mandatory Handgun Purchase Delays on Homicide and Suicide *14, 
(University of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No 2629397, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YM24-YHHS (“As is often the case with any policy passed by legislators, 
there is concern that the laws were passed endogenously to the outcome variable. We al-
leviate this concern as much as possible . . . by including controls that capture the political 
atmosphere of each state.”). In the context of our study, we compare what happened to 
perceived LGB couples in treated jurisdictions before the law changed and find that they 
looked very similar to the control states. 
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TABLE 7:  PROBABILITY OF LOAN ACCEPTANCE BY RACE AND 
GENDER IN STATES WITH CHANGES TO CITY OR STATE LAW241 
Applicant Co-applicant State Law 
White Male Black Male -0.086 
(0.074) 
White Male White Male -0.001 
(0.008) 
Black Male Black Male -0.031** 
(0.015) 
Black Male White Male -0.014 
(0.057) 
White Female Black Male 0.012 
(0.015) 
White Female White Male 0.004 
(0.003) 
Black Female Black Male -0.024*** 
(0.006) 
Black Female White Male -0.004 
(0.041) 
White Female Black Female 0.045 
(0.048) 
White Female White Female 0.009 
(0.005) 
Black Female Black Female -0.019 
(0.023) 
Black Female White Female -0.067 
(0.044) 
White Male Black Female 0.002 
(0.011) 
Black Male Black Female -0.007 
(0.004) 
Black Male White Female 0.021 
(0.012) 
Sample Size 
R Squared 
 5,864,086 
0.42 
 241 In this table, each column represents the difference-in-differences estimate of the 
effect of the passage of a state law for each applicant/co-applicant pairing. Like other ta-
bles, this regression, estimated at the individual loan application level, includes fixed ef-
fects for year, bank-by-county, and all other controls included in each regression. Addi-
tionally, this regression includes group-fixed effects and a state/locality law time effect to 
capture the difference-in-differences estimator. Statistical significance levels are marked 
as * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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FIGURE 10:  THE EFFECT OF STATE- AND LOCAL-LEVEL LAWS 
PROHIBITING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION ON THE 
PROBABILITY OF LOAN ACCEPTANCE242 
Prior to a discussion of these results, it is important to sound 
a caveat. These results are derived from changes in only a handful 
of cities and states and, as a result, the precision of some of these 
estimated effects may suffer. This is evident in some of the larger 
confidence intervals portrayed by the vertical bands in Figure 10 
below. 
With that in mind, the results presented here are quite inter-
esting. To this point, regardless of how we slice the data (by re-
gion, politics, bank size, or intergroup proximity), we find that 
four groups of male same-sex loan co-applicants (black male/black 
male pairs, black male/white male pairs, white male/black male 
pairs and white male/white male pairs) are consistently discrim-
inated against. These groups are approved for the same loans 
with the same income at the same banks in the same counties at 
 242 Each difference-in-differences estimator of the effect of the passage of a state anti–
sexual orientation discrimination law on each race/gender group is represented by the di-
amond dots. The bands represent confidence intervals for the difference-in-differences es-
timates. By way of comparison, we have also included the baseline estimates from Figure 7 
with triangle dots and corresponding confidence intervals. The bands represent confidence 
intervals. For more information on how to interpret this graph, see the previous figures. 
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lower rates. With the introduction of local antidiscrimination 
laws, a different picture emerges. Of the four disadvantaged 
groups, three are statistically indistinguishable from zero, mean-
ing there is no evidence of discrimination in lending. The fourth 
group—a pair consisting of two black males—is still statistically 
significant and negative, meaning that that group is still less 
likely to have a loan approved, but the magnitude is smaller com-
pared to the main results. In Table 7, a pair of two black males is 
7.5 percentage points less likely to have a loan approved, all else 
equal. With the passage of a state or local antidiscrimination law, 
that rate drops in half to 3.1. The results suggest that state- and 
local-level attempts to discourage discrimination may be fruitful.243 
To summarize, the analysis of the two potential mechanisms 
to discourage discrimination based on sexual orientation leads, at 
best, to mixed results. If population density is a good proxy for 
intergroup contact, we find no evidence that contact in more ur-
banized areas reduces the bias toward gay male couples. How-
ever, local attempts to enact laws designed to protect against sex-
ual orientation discrimination may hold promise in reducing 
discrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Discrimination in home mortgage lending has, unfortu-
nately, a long history in the United States. Recent efforts to stave 
off discrimination in mortgage lending have included the creation 
of mortgage application databases to which lenders are required 
to report. Drawing on this data, the Article presents the first evi-
dence of systematic, nationwide bias against perceived gay male 
applicants that transcends every geographical and political 
boundary in the United States. The data further suggests that 
prejudice, rather than statistical discrimination, is the driving 
force. The law has much to do with the current situation. With 
few exceptions, federal law and the majority of states do not pro-
hibit lenders from discriminating against applicants based on 
their sexual orientation (although some localities do). In these ju-
risdictions, sexual orientation discrimination is not only legal, it 
is a defense that may allow a discriminatory lender to exculpate 
itself. 
 243 As we explain earlier, however, the results should be taken with caution given 
that they are derived from changes in laws in only a few states and localities. 
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This study has important implications beyond the housing 
and mortgage lending markets. Sexual orientation discrimination 
has also been a burning topic in Title VII (employment) and 
Title IX (education) cases. In 2015, the same year in which the 
Supreme Court decided that the states are required to license and 
recognize same sex marriages,244 the EEOC held that Title VII’s 
prohibition against sex discrimination includes sexual orienta-
tion.245 That controversial decision was considered an outlier. For 
over half a century, the US Courts of Appeals resisted extending 
the prohibition against sex discrimination to sexual orientation.246 
Although the Supreme Court has never spoken on the question, 
things may soon change.247 A few months ago, the Seventh Circuit, 
overruling previous precedents, held that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is a form of sex discrimination and, therefore, is pro-
hibited under Title VII.248 The decision sent shock waves through-
out the legal community. And although the Seventh Circuit’s 
ruling was limited to Title VII purposes, it marks the beginning 
of a more dramatic change that may spread across jurisdictions 
and Titles.249 
 
 244 See generally Obergefell, 135 S Ct 2584. 
 245 See generally Baldwin v Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC). 
 246 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, Zarda v 
Altitude Express, No 15-3775, *7 (2d Cir filed July 26, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 
WL 3277292) (DOJ Brief) (“[U]ntil the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Hively earlier 
this year, the ten other Courts of Appeals to have addressed the issue had uniformly joined 
this Court in holding that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination does not encompass 
sexual orientation discrimination.”). 
 247 On May 29, 2018, the defendant-employer in Zarda filed a petition for writ for 
certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to reverse the Second Circuit’s decision and hold that 
Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. See generally Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, Altitude Express, Inc v Zarda, No 17-1623 (US filed May 29, 2018). A 
few days prior, on May 25, 2018, an opposing petition was filed by an employee, asking 
the Supreme Court to reverse the Eleventh Circuit in Bostock v Clayton County Board of 
Commissioners, 723 Fed Appx 964 (11th Cir 2018), and hold that Title VII does prohibit 
sexual orientation discrimination. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bostock v 
Clayton County Board of Commissioners, No 17-1618 (filed May 25, 2018). 
 248 In Hively, 853 F3d at 341, the Seventh Circuit became the first court to hold that 
“discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination,” explain-
ing “the common-sense reality that it is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex.” Id at 351. Interestingly, the 
Seventh Circuit is the one circuit that has explicitly rejected the Title VII framework in 
FH Act and/or ECOA cases. See, for example, Latimore v Citibank Federal Savings Bank, 
151 F3d 712, 715 (7th Cir 1998) (rejecting McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting in favor of 
direct or circumstantial evidence). 
 249 Recent developments in the Second Circuit are illustrative. On April 18, 2017, the 
Second Circuit upheld its precedent that sexual orientation discrimination is not prohib-
ited by Title VII. See generally Zarda, 855 F3d 76. The decision did not last long. On May 
3, 2017, two weeks after the decision in Zarda, the District Court for the Southern District 
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This Article can inform the ongoing debate over Title VII and 
other laws in pari materia. Indeed, with one exception,250 all US 
circuit courts now adopt and apply Title VII’s jurisprudence in 
mortgage lending.251 The same is true for the agencies in charge 
of enforcing the ECOA and FH Act.252 
We end with an open invitation. Sexual orientation discrimi-
nation research is in its very early stages, with the first major 
study conducted overseas as late as 2009. We hope that our study 
will add to an important discussion that, to date, involves many 
theories but little empirical evidence. In that sense, a major con-
tribution of our study is setting the grounds for a new form of 
econometric studies in the area. 
 
of New York defied the Second Circuit’s precedent. See Philpott v New York, 252 F Supp 
3d 313, 317 (SDNY 2017). Relying on the Seventh Circuit decision in Hively, it held that 
Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination also prohibits sexual orientation discrim-
ination. See id at 316–17. On May 25, 2017, the Second Circuit granted Zarda’s request 
for rehearing en banc to consider whether Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation through its prohibition of discrimination “[b]ecause of . . . sex.” See 
Zarda, 883 F3d at 113. On July 26, 2017, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an amicus 
curiae brief on behalf of the United States arguing that “the en banc Court should reaffirm 
its settled precedent holding, consistent with the longstanding position of the Department 
of Justice, that Title VII does not reach discrimination based on sexual orientation.” DOJ 
Brief at *1 (cited in note 246). On February 26, 2018, the Second Circuit rejected the DOJ’s 
argument and reversed its decision. Deciding en banc, it held that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is a “subset of sex discrimination,” thereby overruling Simonton and Dawson. 
See Zarda, 883 F3d at 112; see also notes 23–27 and accompanying text. 
 250 Of the circuits that have considered the issue, the Seventh Circuit stands alone in 
rejecting Title VII jurisprudence to evaluate ECOA cases. See Latimore v Citibank Federal 
Savings Bank, 151 F3d 712, 715 (7th Cir 1998). In Latimore, Judge Richard Posner, the 
author of the Hively decision, held that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework 
for establishing a prima facie case in the employment discrimination context is unsuitable 
in credit discrimination cases because “there is no basis for comparing the defendant’s 
treatment of the plaintiff with the defendant’s treatment of other, similarly situated per-
sons.” Id. Accordingly, in ECOA cases in the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiff must prove her 
case “in a conventional way, using direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. See also 
Matthiesen v Banc One Mortgage Corp, 173 F3d 1242, 1246 n 4 (10th Cir 1999) (declining 
to reach the question of whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard applies 
in ECOA cases). 
 251 See note 248. 
 252 See Part I.A.2. 
